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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A. Statement of The Problem 
Since the end of World War II, American companies, 
in increasing numbers, have announced the details of plans 
whereby employees might acquire stock-holdings in their indi-
vidual companies. In many respects, this renaissance of em-
ployee stock ownership as a corporate policy parallels the 
period of initial popularity and acceptance of this device 
by many companies following World War I. At that time the 
subject of employee ownership was one of great controversy 
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and the collapse of the majority of plans during the depression 
seemed to settle the arguments in favor of those who opposed 
the idea of enabling employees to purchase stock in the com-
panies for which they worked. As recently as 1946, Bryce 
Stewart and Walter J. Couper stated in "Profit Sharing and 
Stock Ownership For Wage Earners and Executives" that "em-
ployee stock ownership in the United States has now shrunk to 
its proportions of a quarter century ago," that period pre-
ceding the feverish stock speculation of the twenties, which 
period by 1928 found the National Industrial Conference 
Board estimating that more than a million wage and salaried 
employees in the United States owned, or were paying for, 
over $1 bil~ion worth of their companies' securities. Yet, 
today, only a few years later, many companies are adopting 
employee ownership. The New York Stock Exchange has stated 
that approximately 40% of all domestic companies having com-
mon stock listed on the exchange have adopted stock purchase 
or option plans between 1947 and 1956.• Meanwhile, opponents 
of employee ownership point back to past experience and the 
inability of the majority of plans to survive the first time 
around. 
But while history presents the past, managements 
of companies today are faced with the problem of deciding 
whether or not they should develop a plan to enable their 
employees to buy stock in their companies in lieu of the 
changes and improvements made in the formulation of plans 
and in their administration. With companies in the neigh-
borhood or in the same industry adopting plans, pressure 
. comes from employees to allow them to buy stock, and it is 
often hard for a company to be a holdout when stock purchase 
plans become accepted practice in an area or industry. 
But although employee stock purchase plans can 
bring benefits to companies and eligible employees, there 
6 
are also accompanying problems and difficulties, and each 
management muet decide for or against a plan for its particu-
lar company. At present there is no one source one can con-
sult in order to obtain an inclusive, up to date presentation 
of this matter. 
• ·12' p. 1. 
B. Purpose of The Study 
It is the ~urpose of this study to give an overall 
analysis of the subject of employee ownership of stock. It 
is hoped that a clear concept of the theory and practice of 
employee ownership within the decade will be presented, with 
the end result being a work which will furnish employees an 
understanding appraisal of the subject which, it is believed, 
would be helpful to them in assessing their own_ position with 
respect to buying stock in their companies; and of deeper 
importance and significance, presenting to company managements 
a study which it is hoped will be of great benefit in under-
standing the formulation, administration and inherent prob-
lems in employee ownership, thus, contributing effectively 
to a management's decision to embrace or avoid employee owner-
ship. 
C. Previous Work In This Field 
Employee stock ownership in this decade has not 
received the widespread coverage in text form granted its 
"rather" profit-sharing. Perhaps, the experience in the 
twenties which found many eminent writers of the period 
out on a limb predicting the brightest success for the method 
as a business and social device, only to see it collapse with 
the collapse of the stock market, has caused many to shy away 
from the subject, fearful of the supposed necessity of expres-
sing a prediction of the future success of the movement in 
this era. Thus, we find the extended treatments of the subject 
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primarily consisting of expositions of the characteristics 
and details of the plans of many different companies, com-
paring and discussing different features. The National Ind-
ustrial Conference Board in its Studies in Personnel Policy 
has presented many different plans and their charac·teristics, 
From time to time the New York Stock Exchange has presented 
the details of plans of companies listed on the Exchange. 
New developments in attempting to eliminate risk, combining 
successful features of different plans, significant legis-
lation, particularly with respect to stock options, however, 
have made much of the previous work in this area obsolete. 
Continuing analysis in a changing area of this kind is nec-
essary. 
D. Scope of The Study 
This study seeks to cover the entire field of 
employee stock ownership, that is, methods whereby employees, 
executives and the rank and file, by making payments in some 
form to the company, receive shares of stock; as distinguished 
from bonus arrangements whereby company executives and/or 
· key workers are on a yearly or other occasional basis, given 
a compensatory bonus consisting of company stock; or profit 
sharing arrangements whereby employee portions of profits 
under a profit sharing plan are presented in the :form o:f stock. 
Methods of enabling employees to obtain stock will 
be considered in the three broad categories found in use today 
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in the great majority of companies; simple purchase plans 
wherein an employee is given an opportunity to purchase 
stock of the employing company usually at a set price by 
paying a lump sum and acquiring title to the stock, or auth-
orizing payroll deductions at the completion of which the 
stock becomes the employee's property; stock option plans 
wherein ari employee, usually an executive, is offered a defi-
nite amount of stock at a specified price but with usually an 
extended period in which to take up the offer, with no oblig-
ation to purchase the securities unless it is to the employee's 
advantage; and thrift plans wherein an employee authorizes 
regular payroll deductions for a trust type fund which is inv-
ested in the corporation's stock with the corporation augment-
ing the fund by a certain percentage of the amount contributed 
by the employee or by a percentage of the employee's base pay 
or where the payroll deductions are authorized for the pur-
chase of a specified security such as a government savings 
bond and the corporation gives the employee shares of its 
stock in proportion to the securities bought by the employee. 
E. Method of Analysis . 
This study will proceed by first analyzing the 
history and background of the employee stock ownership 
movement. Then, presenting and discussing the characteris-
tics of ownership plans according to the three significant 
types, simple purchase, option and thrift plans, giving reP-
resentations from recent typical company plans. This is to 
9 
be followed py a presentation and analysis of t he significant 
problems fac~ng the employee and employer with special em-
phasis on the position of a company management and its dec-
ision whether to introduce a stock owne.rship plan for its 
employees. Use will be made of selected reference books and 
pamphlets, details of specific company plans listed in pro-
spectuses and text announcements, and periodical literature 
c.oncern1ng the subject. 
io 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
OF THE EMFLOYEE OWNERSHIP MOVEMENT 
A. The Early History o~ Employee Ownership 
Employee stock ownership originally developed as 
·an outgrowth o~ profit-sharing. The earliest beginnings 
of profit-sharing took place in France shortly after the 
start of the 19th century,* .and it is to this same country 
that the earliest employee stock ownership plan is traced.** 
The transition from a profit-sharing plan to an 
employee stock plan can be simply theorized. During the 
development of .the methods of distributing profits under a 
profit-sharing plan, the idea undoubtedly came to an employ-
er to distribute, rather than a cash portion of .the company's 
profit, a share of stock. Perhaps, it waa felt that this 
might provide even more incentive to the employee inasmuch as 
in addition to receiving a profit share, there was the fUture 
expectation of further periodic gain from possession of the 
share(s) of stock. Also to the employer came the hope that, 
perhaps, the lack of a common understanding between the labor 
force and capital interests might be overcome. From this 
distribution of stock to the employees as their share of the 
profits, the subsequent step of offering the stock for sale 
*13, p. 5. 
**6, p. 212. 
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to interested employees can be imagined. With this extension, 
however, employee stock ownership became discernibly sep-
arated from profit-sharing. In terms of definition, profit-
sharing may be called: payments in the form of cash, stock, 
options, warrants or otherwi se, g·1Ven under a predet ermined 
and continuing policy by . the management of a company to all 
or any group of its officers or employees in addition to 
their established wages or salaries;* and employee stock 
ownership: any plan sponsored by an employer whereby employ-
ees are assisted in acquiring stock of the company for which 
they work.**· 
The original idea of selling stock to employees 
spread from France to Great Britain, where it later became 
known as "co-partnership," and then to the United States, 
where its eventual development far outstripped tbat in Great 
Britain or on the European Continent. 
B.. The First .Aroeric an Plans 
Historically speaking, the first plan by a United 
States Company was that developed by the A.w. Burritt Com-
pany of Bridgeport, Connecticut , in 1893.*** At about this 
time the railroads became interested in the device but only 
Illinois Central succeeded in developing a plan. At the turn 
of the century, however, some of the larger corporat~ons began 
*13, p. 1. 
**6, p . 210. 
***13; p ~ -'56. 
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to adopt plans. Between 1900 and 1903, Pittsburgh Coal, 
National Biscuit, Firestone Tire and Rubber, Procter and 
Gamble and United States Steel announced the establishment 
of plans. BUt, it was not until the end of World War I that 
the movement caught fire. 
C. The Effect of World War I 
The war period had a signif'icant influence on the 
widespread growth of the movement and is of interest in that 
following World War II the present employee ownership move-
ment in the United States received its forward impetus. 
There were economic and psychological factors common to both 
periods and they should be recognized in studying employee 
ownership in this era. 
Wage rates and earnings were unusually high dur-
ing World War I and. immediately after. Much of the increased 
earnings went into savings and a considerable portion toward 
the purchase of World War I Liberty Bonds. People became 
familiar with the habit of saving and also with the physical 
possession of valuable ce·rtificates of ownership. During 
this period, American Telephone and Telegraph, American 
Tobacco, Eastman Kodak, Texas Company, several of the Stan-
dard Oil companies and others inaugurated plans.* 
*3' p. 7. 
D. The Post-War Period 
The recession of 1921-1922 hindered, somewha t, 
any new developments for a while, but in 1923, hitching 
a ride on the highest prosperity wave, up until that time, 
in United States history, the idea of selling stock to em-
ployees began ita period of widest popularity, lasting 
until the beginning of the great depression in 1929. The 
widespread acceptance of customer ownership of stock during 
the early 1920's moreover, helped to fan the fire. 
Customer ownership was popularized by the util-
ities, particularly those of the Insull empire. Stock in 
utilities was sold to customers by light and power com-
panies.* The Insull companies first offered the stock to 
their employees believing that they were thus t'laying the 
groundwork on which they could erect the sales of securi-
ties to customers through their employees.u** In 1922 and 
1923 utility company customers bought $350,000,000 worth of 
securities of such companies and the small investor became 
an important source of capital for the utilities.**~ Thus, 
this movement further popularized stock purchasing and 
helped to promote the development by companies of plans 
for the sale of stock to their employees. 
*3, p. 2. 
**5, P• 90. 
***3, p. 2. 
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* As of May 1, 1926, over 200 companies had developed plans. 
This movement profoundly influenced much of the 
sociological and economic thinking of the time. One of 
the greatest proponents of employee ownership was Thomas 
Nixon Carver, a prominent author of the period and Professor 
of Political Economy at Harvard University. In 1926, Pro-
fessor Carver wrote a book entitled "The Present Economic 
Revolution In The United States" in which he stated: "Lab-
orers are rapidly becoming capitalists as well as laborers; 
and to a gradually increasing degree, capitalists are finding 
it difficult to hire all their work done and are compelled to 
do more and more of it themselves. In short, capitalists are 
becoming laborers as well as capitalists. Thi·s actual blend-
ing of the two so-called classes means that there will be no 
more classes in this country." 
In 1929, a Nationa.l Industrial Conference Board 
report listed 389 companies with plans. 
E. The Effect of The Depression 
The depression which began in 1929, however, 
undermined the employee ownership movement. Employment 
declined; wages shrunk; in many instances, employees not only 
lost their jobs but found the stock of their companies worth-
less. Others found themselves bound to contracts to pay large 
amounts for stocks which were now worth fractions. The effect 
*3, P• 8. 
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of the depression on the philosophy of employee owner-
ship was profound. As a serious management tool it appeared 
worthless. Who could imagine that it would reach the pro-
portions of a quarter-century later, when it rode another 
wave of record prosperity~ 
From the collaps e of the majority of the plans 
during the depression (many of those that continued in 
existence were inactive, that is, there was no partici-
pation) until the Second World War there was little activity 
in the area of employee stock ownership. 
F. Revival During The 1940's 
It was during World War II that the re-awakening 
to the ownership device began. The progressive income taxes 
in effect shackled the ability of companies to satisfactor-
ily compensate their executives. Thus, several companies 
granted generous options to executives to purchase stock.* 
The thinking behind th~ method was that in some instances 
the profit that might be realized from sale of the stock 
would possibly be taxed as a capital gain, which meant a 
lower tax rate. 
As a tax evasion device, this method evoked un-
favorable comment on the part of many. The financial editor 
of the New York World-Telegram wrote several critical edit-
orials directed toward Sinclair Oil, Twentieth Century Fox 
Film and Paramount Pictures. In one editorial he stated: 
*27, P• 66. 
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11 It is bec.oming pretty evident that the wave of options 
currently being proposed are designed chiefly to avoid 
income taxes."* This practice eventually came to the 
courts and in the case of the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue V. J .ohn H. Smith (324 U.S.-2d-177 Feb. 26, 1945) 
the Supreme Court upheld the position of the Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue and held that stock options .given as corn-
pensation for services are compensation and taxable in the . 
amount of the excess in value of the shares over the option 
price at whatever time the options are exercised. This seemed 
17 
to give final say to an old controversy extending back to 1921, 
when the rate structures were set up,**over . whether gains on 
options could be treated as capital gains and taxed at the 
lower rate (25%) or compensation and taxed at the regular 
income tax rates. 
For a while it appeared that all interest in em-
ployee ownership seemed to have been extinguished. But the 
option idea was kept in mind and did not die with this court 
decision. For it came at a time which was very similar to 
the World War !~ period. Another war economy had been created. 
Wages reached a new high. Savings were at a high level. Iw!il-
lions had bought government war bonds. Prosperity was begin-
ning a new record climb. BUt still the climate was a little 
different. There was one experience to look back toward and 
*13, p. 64. 
**42, p. 140. 
it was not a pleasant one. And there were no predictions 
of beneficial social consequences. But as the option idea 
joined forces with these parallel conditions, the new era of 
employee ownership was born. The underlying spark of the 
movement being a characteristically human one, the ever pre-
sent search for a new way to get around the progressive 
income tax rates. 
G. Fest-War Period 
In 1946, the American Telephone and Telegraph 
Company, with a primary goal of seeking new capital, arranged 
for employee purchases of AT~T stock. Nearly all of the 
2.8 million shares offered to employees were bought. At 
about this time, the controv~rsy over the taxation .on options, 
believed to have been settled, was re-kindled. A bill was 
filed seeking to have options taxed as capital gains providing 
that the sale price was close to the option price.* With a 
spark of hope, some companies continued to offer options to 
executives. Others came out with plans for wage earners. In 
1947, 18 companies, with stock listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange inaugurated plans. In 1948, 12 companies including 
DU Pont, Dow and Westinghouse made offerings to employees. 
In 1949, 22 companies were added; in 1950, 29 new offerings.** 
And in addition, in 1950, of most importance, a significant 
*18, p. 52. 
**12, pp. 118-134 
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change in the Internal Revenue Code which prompted, in 1951, 
75 companies to come out with plans, and in 1952, 94 new plans. 
Thus, the effect of the changing law is immediately apparent 
in 1951 and 1952 company policy. This law's influence on 
the renaissance of the employee ownership movement cannot be 
overlooked. The great majority of the new plans, 55 of the 
1951 plans, 73 of the 1952 plans, were of the option variety. 
(The basic operating dirferences between plans will be ana-
lyzed in subsequent chapters.)· 
In 1954, a further change was made in the tax law 
which made options even more favorable as an incentive device 
for executives and thus, there were more pressures for plans. 
Of course, offerings being made to executives would logically 
bring demands from wage earners and thus came increased pres-
·sure for plans attributable to workers. However, the unpleas-
ant experience of the earlier plans, their booming development 
following the First World War and their collapsing end with 
the depression has left many understanding managements un-
certain toward providing, once again, stock for sale to em-
ployees. Many companies have sought to minimiz-e risk -.as . 
much as possible and have designed specially adapted plans 
for employees. 
In the following chapters we shall analyze the 
plans by type ·and then from a management point of view con-
sider the use of ownership plans as a management tool. First 
t~e simple stock purchase plan, the least complex of the 
typical plans will be presented. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE SIMPLE STOCK PURCHASE PLAN 
A. Definitions 
The title, Simple Stock Purchase Plan, desig-
nates those plans which provide that an employee may buy, 
at a set price, up to a maximum number predetermined by 
the company, shares of the stock of the company by auth-
orizing payroll deductions for a certain period of time 
or by making a lump sum payment. The basic mechanics of 
this method are relatively easy to understand. The em-
ployer provides stock for sale at a certain price, the 
employee provides the money for purchase. But underne ath 
these basic elements of the purchase contract lie many 
important determinations which must be decided before a 
company can announce the details of a plan, once the de-
cision to adopt one has been made. This decision, in 
itself, is not our concern at this point, but will become 
significant later. Rather, in order to obtain an under-
st anding background, the design of a typical plan will 
now be considered. First, the various factors .which 
must be determined will be examined; then, an example 
will be given of a particular company's simple stock 
purchase plan. 
Since many of the basic factors -apply not only 
to the simple stock plan, but also to the option and thrift 
'21. 
plans, they will be covered here and merely rererred to 
in the chapters concerned with option and thrift plans. 
B. Principle Characteristics of Stock Pla.na 
1. Eligibility 
One of the first and major considerations com-
mon to almost any employee plan, whether stock purchase, 
profit-sharing, medical insurance, vacation, bonus, etc., 
is to whom is it applicable. Are executives included; are 
factory help, white collar he~p included; is it a blanket 
plan applicable to .all; does one need seniority to be eli-
gible? This, of course, is an important criterion. It 
sets the scope or the plan from a management point of view. 
It determines ror the individual worker whether or not he is 
included. 
2. Kind of Stock 
A plan can ofrer common stock, preferred stock, 
or a "special issue" stock created solely for sale to em-
ployees. 
3. Rights 
A share once owned can convey all the particular 
rights which the -share gives a market purchaser, voting, pre-
emptive, cumulative, etc., or it can convey special rights. 
A company must determine, fUrthermore, whether a purchaser 
will receive dividends on stock which he is in the process or 
paying for, or whether dividends will be credited only upon 
delivery of the certificate. 
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4. Source of the Stock 
A company can offer for sale .unissued treasury 
stock, . can purchase stock in the open market for re-sale, 
or may declare a special issue for employee purchase. 
5. Price of the Stock 
Stock can be sold at market price, at a percent-
age discount, at a dollar discount, at par, or at some 
other ·arbitrarily determined price. 
6. Number of Shares Per ·Employee 
An employee may be limited to a fixed number of 
shares; may be able . to buy a percentage of his· yearly wage 
in stock or may be allowed so many shares for each year of 
service. 
7. Period of Offer 
A plan may have a duratioh of a certain number of 
years or months; may have a deadline of a specified date 
shortly after announcement, by which date all intentions to 
purchase, or contracts of purchase, or authorizations of 
payroll deductions must be filed; or may be of indefinite 
length. 
8. Method of Payment 
23 
An employee may authorize payroll deductions which 
will be put aside a.nd as soon as a sum sufficlent to buy a 
share has accumulated be used to purchase; may make deductions 
which are put into a fUnd which periodically purchases stock 
and distributes it to employees when their deductions are 
enough to pay for a share; or an employee can pay a single 
lump sum for the stock. If payroll deductions are used, 
determination must be made of maximum and minimum periodic 
deductions and also of the period over which deductions 
will have to be completed; whether a down payment will be 
required; and who will pay for whatever brokerage or odd 
lot fees that might be incurred. 
9. Interest Payments 
The company must deci.de if · it will pay interest 
on the employee deductions which are accumulating. 
10. Delivery of Stock 
The company must determine whether the stock will 
be delivered after each share is paid for; after five or ten 
shares are paid for; or on a ·monthly, quarterly, or yearly 
basis. 
11. Transfer of Rights or ·stock 
The company must decide whether an employee can 
transfer rights to the stock while paying for it; and whether 
it can be sold after it becomes possessed. 
12. Cancellation of Subscription 
The company must decide whether an employee can 
withdraw from a plan; and if so, whether be is given the 
2.4 
stock already purchased, or is 'given hie money back; and if 
given his money, whether he will receive interest on his money. 
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13. Default of Subscriber 
The company must decide what action it will take 
in the event a purchaser skips payments. Does this result in 
expulsion from the plan; or can defaulted payments be brought 
up to date with participe.tion in the plan continuing. 
14. Layoff or Leave of Absence 
If an employee is laid off or granted a leave of 
absence, the · ~ompany must decide wh~ther he is required to 
withdraw from the plan or if he is permitted to suspend pay-
ments for the duration of his absence from the company. 
15. Termination of Employment 
If an employee's service with a company is ter-
minated by reason of retirement, discharge, death, the com-
pany must have a plan for settling the accumulated accounts. 
16. Modification or Discountinuance 
In the event of subsequent modification or ter-
mination of the existing stock . plan, the company must have 
formulated a policy with respect to the effect of the new 
action on the current plan. 
17. Repurchase 
The company must decide whether under any cir-
cumstances it will repurchase · stock from employees • . 
Thus, it can be seen that a stock purchase plan 
has many variables and that there is opportunity for almost 
infinite combinations. There is no set pattern. Although 
our concern is primarily the management decision of whether 
to adopt a plan or not, . it is · ~pparent that~ positive dec-
ision reflects many subsequent decisions. One may frankly 
ask, at this point, is it worth the administrative headachea 
to have a plan? If employees want stock they can buy it 
themselves on the market. This will be considered later. 
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Now, however, having presented the factors and variables in~ 
herent in an employee purchaee plan, let us look at a con-
crete example and see how one company .has incorporated the 
different alternatives into a .stock purchase plan. The 
headings listed under Principle Characteristics of Stock Plans, 
above, will be followed. The source of the information is 
excerpts from the Prospectus, dated October 21, 1954, of the 
American Telephone and Telegraph Company Employees' Stock 
Plan, as furnished by the New York Stock Exchange. 
c. The American Telephone and Telegraph Company Plan 
1. Eligibility. Any employee of the c.ompany (with certain 
restrictions applicable to employees on leave of absence or 
layoff), except officers, provided that the employee has 
three months' service on October 10, 1954, as shown by 
payroll records and provided that he is in service on the 
date his election to purchase is received, is eligible. 
2. Kind of Stock. Common stock. 
3. Rights. An employee will have no rights as a stock-
holder with respect to shares purchased until the date of 
'27 
9. Interest. Interest will be.allowed on payments at the 
rate of 2% per annum compounded semi-annually. 
10. Delivery. A certificate for shares will be issued as 
soon as practicable after the end of the month following 
that in which payment is completed. 
2.8 
11. Transfer of Rights or Stoc·k. An employee's rights may not 
be sold, pledged, assigned or transfered in any manner. 
12. Cancellation. An employee who has elected to purchase 
shares may cancel his election as ~o any or all such shares 
by giving written notice of cancellation to the payroll office. 
The employee will receive cash plus interest~ He may take 
this in stock with cash balance if any. 
13. Default. If an employee cannot make a payment through 
deductions for a given period due to insufficient pay, he may 
make it in cash or when pay again is sufficient, pay the de-
ficiency in cash or a~range for increased installments that 
will allow completion of payments by July, 1957. The em-
ployee, however, may make up a remaining deficiency even 
though increased installments are authorized, by a lump sum 
payment at any time. 
14. Lay-off or Leave of Absence. An employee laid off or 
granted a leave of absence may either suspend payments during 
his absence, but not for more than six months, nor beyond 
July 31, 1957; or make installment payments in cash during 
his absence, but not for more than six months in the case of 
lay-off. 
15. Termination of Employment. If before payments are com~ 
leted, an employee dies, resigns, is dismissed or transfers 
to a company other than the American Company, or a subsidiary, 
or if the company by which he is employed should cease to be 
a subsidiary, his election to purchase shall be deemed to 
have been cancelled at that time. 
16. Modification or Discontinuance. The American Company may 
prescribe administrative rules hereunder and in any partic-
ular case may allow a reasonable extension of the time with-
in which an election to purchase must be delivered if it det-
ermines that there are special circumstances that warrant such 
action. 
17. Repurchase. There is no repurchas.e by the company from 
stockholding employees. 
The above provisions. of the plan are the major and 
significant ones. There are further ramifications and ex-
ceptions included in the plan. Their extended detail is not 
important to our consideration. They may be examined by ref-
erence to the company . prospectus. In addition, the follow-
ing statement is made by AT&T: "Determination of the Amer-
ican Company as to any question which may arise with respect 
to the interpretation Of the provisions of this offer shall 
be final." 
Thus, the highlights of the AT&T plan have been 
presented. What should the reader gather to this point? 
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The reader should be becoming familiar with tl;le framework 
of employee ownership. OUt of the various factors, AT&T has 
evolved a simple stock purchase plan which it has offered to 
i ts employees. As of a certain date an employee · of the com-
pany elects to purchase a certain number of shares of stock 
and the company deducts from his pay. an amount to be put to-
warda eventual purchase of the stock. When the employee has 
completed his purchase, the company delivers the stock to the 
employee and he is free to dispose of it as he wishes. The 
employee's motives for buying and the employer's motives for 
selling the stock, p~ua the many inherent problema involved 
are not our concern at this point. It is merely hoped to 
present an understanding exposition of the elements and mech-
anics of a simple stock purchase plan. This is the least 
complex of the methods of employee stock purchase in common 
use age today. It differ.a . in certain respects from the stock 
purchase plans which were in effect in the 1920's. It is 
the basic plan from which the option and thrift plans were 
adapted. In the next chapter the option-type plan will be 
introduced and considered. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE STOCK OPTION PLAN 
A. Definitions and Basic Features of Stock Options 
The stock option is more than a contract to buy 
stock at a set price. As its name implies, it is an option 
to buy. Its development and rise in popularity was prima-
rily a result of the possibility of providing company ex-
ecutives with increased compensation without sacrificing 
the majority of it to taxes. It is the primary cause for 
the re-popularization of stocrk purchase plans for employees. 
Many of the basic elements of a stock option plan are sim-
ilar to those of a simple stock purchase plan. A more de-
tailed examination of its development, sketched out in 
Chapter II, will give a clearer insight into its under-
lying theory. Consider, therefore, the following example 
to illustrate the theory. (Under today's laws the example 
would not qualify because of the large spread between option 
and market price, but it will serve to demons.trate the prin-
ciple of a stock option.) A company, wishing to grant one 
of its high corporate officials, the President, let us say, 
a substantial salary increase, realizes that only a small 
portion of the raise would revert to the official in the 
form of disposable income. The majority of the increase 
goes to the government in the form of taxes. Instead, the 
company decides to give the President the opportunity to 
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buy 1000 shares of its stock, selling on the market at 
$150 per share, for the price of $100 at any time in the 
next five years. Thus, the executive has the chance to 
buy up this stock at his own discretion when he feels the 
time is best. Suppose tha t in two years the stock is up 
to $175 per share and the executive decides to buy. He 
pays for the 1000 shares $100,000. If he holds them for 
6 months and then sella them at market price of $175, he 
receives #175,000 or a profit of #75,000 on the transac-
tion. Under the capital gain tax method, his tax would 
.be 25% and his disposable income would increase by the 
balance. If, however, the $75,000 is taxed at regular 
income tax rates, as additional income, the actual gain 
to the executive would depend on his total income minus 
deductions, but would be much smaller. This is the reason 
for the controversy, tax-wise over the stock option. If 
it can be given capital gain treatment it becomes a pow-
erful incentive and a desired possession. Otherwise it 
is of no outstanding value other than to enable the ex-
I 
ecutive to obtain company stock. Except for the extended 
period of time over which the decision to buy can be made, 
it becomes just another simple stock purchase plan. The 
possessor of the option would not have to buy, but also 
the simple stock purchase plan in most instances, would 
permit the employee to cancel before he has obtained pos-
session of the certificate. Thus this capital gain ben-
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efit could successfully be used during the recent war as a 
circumvention of the salary-freezing regulations or toP-
bracket tax rates. Arguments for and against it, alternative 
methods of using and appraising it, reflected the opposing 
forces; those interested in seeing that the government 
received as much tax revenue as possible; and those inter-
ested in increased executive salaries. Originally, the Treas-
ury Department decided each case individually.# Court dec-
isions varied with different emphasis in different courts 
on different aspect s of a particular case. When it appeared 
clearly evident that a stock•option had been granted as 
11 compensation11 then it was ruled that profits therefrom con-
stituted "salary" and the heavier income tax rates had to be 
applied. However, the Smith case and the subsequent Treasury 
ruling decreed that profits obtainable through exercise of 
stock-options are subjected to the full income tax rate. No 
longer could it be claimed that they represented "capital 
gains." The 1950 Federal Tax Law, however, changed the . pre-
vious ruling, and permitted executives exercising an option 
to obtain the desired tax advantages. However, in order 
to be included under the favorable tax laws, the law placed 
certain restrictions on the option contracts. Thus, the 
eligible options, the desirable ones, became referred .. to as . 
restricted stock options. The 1954 Internal Revenue Code 
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# For an extended treatment of the laws and cases see 42, p.l40. 
further clarified and amplified the eligibilities.* There-
fore, the option price must be at least 85% of the fair 
market value when the option was granted. The stock may 
not be disposed of for two years after the option was re-
ceived and six months after the option is exercised. There 
is no tax on any income until after the stock is disposed of. 
If the option price was at least 95% of the fair market 
value when the option was granted, the profit realized ulti-
mately is all capital gains. If the option price was between 
85% and 95% of fair market value, a portion of the profit, 
that between. 85% and 95% is taxed as ordinary income. An 
employer gets no deduction in his income tax for the compen-
sation paid in this form.** 
However, in some instances, stock options which 
do not qualify as restricted stock options may provide fav-
orable tax advantages. If the option was intended t o give 
the employee a · proprietary interest 'in the corporation and 
not intended as compensation, the transaction is treated as 
an ordinary purchase of stock. The employee realizes no 
income upon exercise of the option and has capital gain 
(or loss) when he sells the stock. If the option is in-
tended as compensation, the value of the option itself is 
treated as taxable income in the year the option is granted. 
The value taken into income is treated as the cos t basis of 
the option. Any gain or loss upon sale . of the option , . or ··of · 
*46, PP• 42-44. 
**46, P• 42. 
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the stock acquired under the option is measured by refer-
ence to this basis together with whatever the individual ac-
tually paid for the option or the stock.* Gain or loss on 
sale of the option or the stock is capital gain or loss. 
This treatment assumes that the option has an ascertainable 
fair market value at the time it is granted. In the absence 
of such value, if the option arrangement, but not t ,he ·· 9:ptton 
itself was intended as compensation, the employee is taxed 
on ordinary income at the time the option is exercised. 
The income is the spread between the fair market value of the 
stock and the option price.** 
Thus, it can be seen that a stock opt ion with 
capital gain~ treatment . can have a powerful effect and be 
a much desired method of employee ownership. Its particular 
discriminating characteristics in comparison with the simple 
stock purchase plan, in addition to the preferential tax 
treatment, are that the recipient has a chance to buy the 
s·tock at a fixed or variable price over an extended period of 
time with no risk at all until the stock is bought, and it 
need never be bought if satisfactory conditions _are not 
realized. Wherea s under the simple stock purhcase plan the 
employee is obligated to purchase a d efinite number of shares 
at t he stated_ price fixed in the agreement and can not back 
out unless the company is willing to cancel. the contract. 
*46, P• 43 • 
. **46 ' p. 44 • 
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The stock option plan, though originally devel-
oped for application to executives is. in many companies pro-
vided for the rank and file. However, when a plan is extended 
to workers, the amount of stock that they are authorized to 
purchase individually is usually a small quantity in compar-
ison with the amount which executives are often authorized. 
The reasoning behind this difference is rather obviously the 
fact that the employee would not be able to finance a pur-
chase of a large amount of stock. And for many executives 
financing the option deal is a vital problem, the significance 
of which will be treated in a later chapter. 
B:. Characteristics of Plans 
In developing an option plan many of the same char-
acteristics discussed in the previous chapter in relation 
to simple purchase plans are present: eligibility, kind of 
stock, source of stock, rights, interest, delivery, amount, 
cancellation, default, etc. In addition there are factors 
which are basic to the option type, that is, determine the 
option price and the option period. In order to get an idea 
of a specific operating plan the stock option plan of the 
Inland Steel Company will be presented. Although most option . 
plans are applicable only to company officers, the Inland 
Steel plan provides a good example in that it is open to 
both officers and the rank and file. The information has 
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been gathered from excerpts of the prospectus, dated 
July 13, 1955, furnished by the New York Stock Exchange. 
C. The Inla nd ?teel Com£any Stock Option Plan 
1. Eligibility. The plan makes stock available for options 
to all employees, including officers, whether or not direc-
tors, of the company and its subsidiaries, who have completed 
at least two years of employment. 
2. Kind of stock. 500,000 shares of the authorized and 
unissued capital stock of the company. 
3. Rights. Employees will not, by reason of granting options, 
have any rights of stockholders of the company until they 
shall, from time to time, exercise their options. 
4. Source. Unissued capital stock. 
5. Price. The per share purchase price of the stock op-
tioned is $69.75, being 90% (with minor adjustment for frac-
tions) of the mean between the highest and lowest sell~ng 
price of the company's capital-stock on the New York Stock 
Exchange on July 12, 1955, the effective date of the plan. 
6. Amount of Stock. Each option covers a number of shares 
.which at the option price equals 30% of the base compensa-
tion, which in the usual case is the amount of wages or sal-
ary, including overtime, bonuses, incentive compensation, 
and the like, received by the employee during the preceding · 
year. 
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7. Duration of Option. An employee who desires his op tion 
to continu e in effect, in whole or in part, is required on 
or before August 11, 1 955, to authorize periodic payroll 
deductions. Options, if not theretofore terminated, may 
be exercised in whole or in part from time to time, during 
the option period commencing July 12, 1956, and end ing July 
31, 1958 , except under certain l imited conditions. 
8. Payments. Employees will authorize periodic payroll 
deductions which are transferred to an individual opt i on 
account, in an amount sufficient in the aggregate (exclusive 
of interest) over a thirty-five month period to pay for the 
number of optioned shares which the employee wishes to have 
continued under option. An employee may mak e cash deposits, 
in addition to payroll deductions, to the credit of his 
option account. Money in the option account is to be used to 
purchase stock whenever t h e employee decides to exerc i se his 
option during the option period. 
9. Interest. The company is required to credit option 
accounts, on June 30 and December 31, of each year, while 
options are in effect, with interest at the rate of 2 % per 
annum on the average of the balance credited to the respective 
option accounts on the first day o f each month during the 
six months' period then ended. 
10 . Delivery. Is suance of certificate upon payment in full. 
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11. Transfer of Right. During the lifetime of an employee, 
his option may be exercised only by the employee himself. 
Options may not be transferred by ~n employee except by 
will of, or laws of descent and distribution applicable to 
the dec_eased employee. 
12. Cancellation. An employee may at any time, and from 
time to time, withdraw all or any part of the then credit 
balance in his stock option account. 
13. Default. The Board of Directors of the Committee, in 
cases of hardship may waive or consent to postponement or 
reduction of payroll deductions and may authorize wi thdrawal 
of all or any part of the amount (including interest) cred-
ited to an employee's account without any reduction in the 
number of shares remaining subject to the employee's option, 
or without termination of his option. 
14. Layoff or Leave of Absence. The option of an employee 
shall to the extent not theretofore exercised terminate in 
the event he shall leave the employ of the company or any 
subsidiary. If employment is terminated by reason of physical 
or mental incapaci,ty, or by reason of entry into military 
service of the United States, the option may be exercised 
at any time within three months after such cessation of 
employment, but in no event prior to August 12, 1955. 
15. Termination of Employment. The option issued to an 
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employee shall terminate if he shall leave the employment 
of the company or any subsidiary of the ·company with ex-
ception such as to join another subsidiary, by reason of 
death anc'J those listed ab.ove. 
16. Modification or Discontinuance. If upon authorization 
of payro~l deductions it appears that more than 500,000 
shares would otherwise continue to be subject to option 
under the plan, the options of all employees who have auth-
orized payroll deductions will be proportionately reduced to 
the extent required so that the aggregate of not more than 
500,000 shares will continue to be optioned under the plan ·~ 
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In case the company shall, prior to July 31, 1958, pay any 
stock dividends on its capital stock or split-up or combine 
its shares, the number of shares deliverable against pay-
ments of $69.75 will be proportionately increased or decreased, 
as the case .may be, and in the event of any other changes 
in the number or kind of issued capital stock (except a 
change resulting through conversion of 3i% debentures of the 
company) the Board of Directors may, in its discretion, 
make an equitable adjustment in the number or kind or option 
price of shares of stock then subject to options. No :frac-
tional shares shall be issued as a result of any such change. 
17. Repurchase. There is no provision for repurchase by the 
company. 
Thus are presented the highlights of the Inland 
S,teel Stock Option Plan. Many exceptions and qualifications 
have not been included. They can be found in the prospectus 
or the copy of the plan filed as an exhibit to the Regist-
ration Statement which presents a complete statement of the 
terms and provisions of the plan. The Inland plan is, more-
over, a definitely diffepent plan than the American Telephone 
and Telegraph plan and points up the basic differences be-
tween a simple stock purchase plan and a stock option plan. 
The employee of AT&T makes an agreement by a certain date 
to buy so much stock from AT&T at a given price. The 
employee of Inland Steel makes an agreement by a certain 
date to take an option on so much stock. If he later decides 
to buy he may. If he decides not to buy he loses nothing . 
Although the empl oyee of AT&T can cancel his agreement, he 
must do so befone enough money has been accumulated to pay 
for whole units of stock. Should, once the agreements are 
entered into, the employee of AT&T take no further action, 
he will end up with his elected number of shares. The emp-
loyee of Inland Steel, however, would end up with an accum-
ulation of money in his option account, but no stock because 
he never exercised his option. The purpose of presenting 
concrete examples of the different company plans is to 
further an understanding of the mechanics of the principle 
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methods. This background is needed in considering the prob-
lems of employee ownership and its ultimate value as a 
management policy. 
Options are not new in terms of the awareness of 
the possibility of a modification of the original employee 
purchase method. Rather, their use has become popular and 
widespread. In terms of development there is a rel atively 
newmethod of employee stock ownership, although a plan 
which in principle incorporated its elements was launched 
in 1926.* But this method has only recently become signi-
ficant. It resulted primarily as a result of th experiences 
of the depression's effect on the early employee ownership 
method. In contrast to the option method, which in practice 
is more slanted toward use in executive plans, this rel-
atively recent method is directed toward use in plans for 
the rank and file and seeks to limit the risks inherent in 
the ' simple purchase plans and option plans. In the next · 
chapter these "thrift" plans will be considered. Thrift 
plan is the author's choice of several designations applied 
to this type by some companies, such as savings plan, in-
vestment plan, even in some instances, stock purchase plan. 
The name chosen by a company does not necessarily indentify 
its plan as a simple stock purchase, option or thrift plan. 
The plan must be analyzed and the distinguishing charac-
teristics segregated before it can be determined whether 
*12' p. 107. 
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a particular plan is in essence a simple purchase, option 
or thrift plan. 
CHAPTER V 
THE THRIFT PLAN 
A. Definitions . and Basic Features of Thrift Plans 
In 1926, the Sun Oil Company inaugurated a 
Stock purchase plan. It differed, however, significantly 
from the plans of the day. It was an outstanding excep-
tion. For in the Sun Oil plan, the company, out of its 
own funds, contributed to the account of each employee 
who took part an amount equal to 50% of the contribution 
of the employee. An employee could contribute up to 10% 
of his basic compensation and the company gave in addition 
half of ·that amount. Although c.alled the Stock Purchase 
Plan for Employees, this type of plan presented the phil-
osophy which has led to the development of what has been 
designated the thrift plan, a method of employee owner-
ship which is increasing in popularity at the present time. 
The major differentiation is the substantial contribution 
by the employer. The thrift plan seeks to promote thrift 
habits in employees as we.ll as providing opportunity for 
investment in the company securities, or in some instances 
in government bonds or even other. selected securities. 
Long run employee employment stability and work incentive 
are underlying factors. Risk tends to be minimized. 
Although individual plans portray wide variations there 
are common features in all. 
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Usually a plan is of no definite duration, 
rather of a continuing nature. An employee desiring 
to participate authorizes payroll deductions which are 
placed in a fund. The money accumulates in the fund with 
each employee, of course, having his individual account. 
In some instances, an employer will contribute an amount 
which is a proportion of the employee's deduction, to the 
employee's account • . In other cases, it will give a share 
of stock for each certain amount left in the savings fund. 
Or if the money in the fund is used to buy stock, the 
company may give a. proportionate number of shares for the 
number bought by the employee. Or some companies will give 
so many shares of stock for an accumulation of money used 
to purchase U.S. Government bonds. Thus, it can be appre-
ciated that variety of method is infinite. But the under-
lying basic characteristics are essentially, a usual 
reference to the plan as a "thrift" or "savings" plan 
rather than as a "stock purchase" or "option" plan; a 
stress on regular rather than intermittent investment; 
a substantial contribution by the employee; occasionally, 
a choice by the employee of the investment medium.* 
B~ Specific Methods and Characteristics 
A few examples from different company plans will 
pe given and then a more detailed presentation of a plan 
*49, p. 697. 
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which will allow comparison with the AT&T and Inland plans 
will be made. 
In the Du Pont Thrift Plan, the company con-
tributes to a trust fund one fourth as much as an employee 
puts into u.s. Savings Bonds. The company contribution is 
used to buy Du Pont common stock. The stock is purchased 
monthly on the open market. Cash dividends are applied to 
the purchase of more stock. Employees may deduct from $12.50 
to $37.50 a month. When an employee becomes eligible for 
a whole share it is put in his name and after the required 
holding period is turned over to the employee.* 
In the Socony Mobil Oil Company Employees Savings 
Plan, an employee can make an allotment which is a percent-
a ge of his annual base pay classification. The company con-
tributes an additional amount equal to 50% of that allotted 
by the employee. At any time an employee can direct the sum 
in his account to be invested in either u.s. Government bonds, 
capital stock of the Socony Mobil Company or the common shares 
of any eligible investment company specified by the employee. 
An eligible investment company is defined as one registered 
under the Investment Company Act of 1940, satisfying certain 
company stipulated provisions .• ** 
The General Electric Savings and Stock Bonus Plan 
*49, p. 698. 
**12, PP• 96-106. 
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provides for the purchase by employees through payroll 
deductions of United States Savings Bonds, Series E, and 
payment by the company of a bonus in General Electric 
common stock to those participating employees who leave 
bonds thus purchased on deposit with the company for a . 
five year holding period.* 
The Sun Oil Company in its Stock Purchase Plan 
pays to an employee fund for the purpose of purchasing 
company stock, 50% of deposita, to be given to the em-
ployee after a five year period.** 
At this point a closer examination will be 
given to a plan, that of the General Motors Company. Its 
characteristics contain many of the features found in the 
simple stock purchase and the option plans presented in 
earlier chapters. The breakdown of the plan will be in 
similar form. The provisions, however, distinguishing 
it from the others and qualifying it as a thrift plan will 
be readily apparent. The information is extracted from the 
11 General Motors Savings-Stock Purchase Program For Sala-
ried Employees In The United States," effective October 1, 
1955, furnished by the New York Stock Exchange. 
C. The General Motors Thrift Plan 
1. Eligibility. All salaried employees in the United 
States with one year or more of continuous employment 
*12, pp. 29-38. 
**12, pp. 107-111. 
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immediately preceding October 1, 1955 shal l become eligible 
to part icipate on the first day of the month coinc i ding 
wi th or next following the completion of one year of con-
tinuous employment. 
2. Kind of Stock. Direct obligations of the U.S. Govern-
ment and General Motors common stock. 
3. Price. Average daily closing market price on the New 
York Stock Exchange during the calendar month preceding 
the date of subscription or purchase. 
4. Rights. Stock is held by the trustee for a five year 
period or until retirement depending on the choice of plan. 
The trustee may not vote the stock but may in its discre-
tion exercise or sell any rights received from the General 
Motors Corporation for the purchase of any additional shares 
or other securities which General Motors may offer to i ts 
stockholders. 
5. Source. Either newly issued stock or stock purchased 
by the Corporation and held in the Treasury. 
6. Amount. An employee may pay into the progr am up to 10% 
of his eligible salary, that being his regula r base salary, 
plus cost-of-living allowance during such period or periods 
as the employee is eligible to participate in the program, 
not to include commissions, drawing accounts, bonuses, over-
time and night shift payments, fees and a llowances, 50% of 
which will be used to purchase U.S. Government obligations, 
50% used to purchase General Motors common stock. 
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7. Duration. No specific terminal date for cessation of 
the program. 
· 8 . Payment. An employee pays through such payroll deduc-
tions as he may authorize from time to time up to 10% of his 
eligible salary (defined above) in even dollar amounts of 
not less than $5.00 a month. At any time during the year of 
formation of the employee's class, he may pay into the pro-
gram through payroll deductions or otherwise, in even dollar 
amounts all or any part of the additional savings required to 
bring his cumulative savings for such year up to 10% of his 
eligible salary. The Corporation will contribute an amount 
eqti a.l to 50% of the amount of the ·employee's savings p aid 
into the prog ram each month. 
9. Interest. In as much as deductions are invested as soon 
as practicable after the end of each month, there is no 
payment by the company of interest on the accumulated deduc-
t i ons. 
10 . Delivery. After the fifth year following the year of 
formation of a class under the Savings Fund Plan, all the 
cash and securities to the employees credit in such class 
are to be delivered to the employee. Those employees 
choosing the Retirement Fund Plan will receive upon retire-
ment the cash and securities to their credit in the class~ 
11. Transfer. No right or interest of any participant in 
the program or in the accounts shall be asBignable or trans-
ferable in whole or in part. 
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12. Cancellation. At any time during the year of formation 
of a class and during the five years following, an employee 
may withdraw all or part of his savings. 
13. Default. No specific provision with regard to default. 
14. Layoff or Leave of Absence. No specific provisions. 
15. Termination of Employment. An employee discharged for 
cause shall receive all cash and securities represented by 
his own savings and earnings thereon. 
16. Modification of Discontinuance. The Corpora tion re-
serves the right, by and through its Board of Directors, 
to amend, modify, suspend or terminate the program but any 
such action shall have no retroactive effect. 
17. Repurchase. There is no provision for company re-
purchase of the securities. 
Thus the essence of the General Motors Thrift 
plan is that an employee wishing to take part in the plan 
authorizes payroll deductions and thereby joins an annual 
"class", the one formed in that particular year. The 
contributions of the employee plus those of the employer 
are placed in either a Savings Fund Plan, or if the em-
ployee should elect in advance, a Retirement Thrift Plan. 
One-half of the employee deductions are invested by a 
trustee in U.S. Government securities, the other half in 
General Motors common stock. The company contribution, 
which is equal to 50% of the employee contribution is 
invested in General Motors common stock. At the end of 
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the fifth year following the year of formation of a class, 
the employee will be given the securities and whatever cash 
(not sufficient to buy) is due. Those in the Retirement 
Thrift Plan will receive their due for each class joined 
upon retirement. 
These are the significant provisions of the 
plan. Many of the qualifications and exceptions have not · 
been included but these can be obtained from the complete 
announcement of the plan. In addition the corporation 
guarantees to provide the employee after five years that 
amount of securities plus cash, irregardless of the market 
value of the securities, equal to his contribution plus 
interest. Furthermore, the plan stipulates that "the 
Committee appointed by the Board shall have full power and 
authority to construe, interpret, and administer this pro-
gram and to pass upon and decide cases presenting unusual 
circumstances in conformity with the objectives of the 
program and under such rules as the Committee may establish. 
Decisions of such Committee shall be final and binding upon 
the Corporation and its employees." 
The significant differences between the thrift 
type plan and the simple purchase of stock option plan can 
be appreciated. As c.an be imagined variety is infinite in 
developing a plan of this type. All, however, reflect 
painstaking management decision and formulation. 
The presentation in this and the preceding chap-
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ters has been expository and straightforward. Insight into 
the background and history of the employee stock owner-
ship movement has been provided, and a presentation of 
the basic types of ownership plans has been made. The 
plans discussed, displayed the end products of three com-
panies who have made a positive decision to provide the 
opportunity for employee stock purchase. Many companies 
have not come out with plans. There are many behind the 
scene considerations and decisions that must first be 
made. The subsequent chapters will attempt to look into 
many of these. The next chapter will analyze some of the 
significant problems of employee ownership. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP 
A. The Inherent Need of The Stock Option 
The stock option is the device which has set the 
wheels of the current employee ownership movement in motion. 
Providing the opportunity of increased compensation at 
limited tax rates, it has the prospect of a powerful in-
centive effect on an individual. But what is needed for 
this effect to be realized? Capital gain treatment is 
given only on the amount of profit over 95% of the market 
price at the time the option was granted. Thus, in order 
to present to an individual a sizeable cash reward, the 
market price of the company stock must rise appreciably 
over the market price at which the option was granted. 
If there is no significant rise in price, then there is 
no significant cash appreciation. Granted that the indi-
vidual does not have to buy. But, if he does not exercise 
the option, then he is no better off than he would have 
been without the option. A salary increase, in lieu of 
which an option is given in certain instances, would, even 
at the higher bracket tax rates, have afforded some cash 
returns and also the accompanying increased upper bracket 
prestige which means as much to many in assessing their 
personal position in comparison with other company officials, 
neighborhood, and other, social aquaintances. 
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In addition to a period of definitely rising 
market value, stability of market fluctuations in the 
short-run period is needed. A period of widely fluctu-
ating prices, similar to those which have hit certain 
companies in recent months can raise havoc with the po-
sition of an individual who has exercised his option and 
is waiting out his six month waiting period, or one who 
has been holding off exercise of his option, waiting to 
find the most advantageous period to buy. In periods of 
wide fluctuation, seeing great paper profits in the pro-
cess of liquidation, can often absorb more of an indi-
vidual's energy through anxiety than he can afford to 
spare. His job performance may suffer immeasurably. 
For example, consider the following: Remember that an 
individual cannot complete an opt ion deal (buy and sell) 
until a mimimum of two years after the option was granted. 
Also, having exercised the option and bought the stock, 
one must hold it for six months before he can sell it. 
The period from the 1955 lows ~b the 1956-57 highs, to 
recent months provides a two year period that is within 
regulations. During that time, the stock of a leader in 
the metals industry went from $42.87, market value per 
share, to $133.50, market value per share, back to $65.00, 
market value per share. The stock of a papermaker rose 
from $35.00 to $63.00, back to $35.00. In the communi-
cations · industry, one company's stock went from $36.75 to 
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$50.37, then fell to $29.00.* If the managements of these 
companies held stock options, how is their morale affected? 
Certainly, they have the incentive to do their best. But 
do what they may for the good of the company, they .cannot 
solely by their own actions provide a steadily rising 
increase of the market value of their company's stock. 
There are so many other variables. Yet, tha t is what is 
needed for the option device to perform as it is intended 
in theory to perform~ The option's success . rides along 
with a rising stock price. Consider the words of Joseph 
A. Grazier, president of the American Radiator and Stand-
ard Sanitary Corporation:** "In a staid company like ours 
whose stock is not rising fast, an executive probably 
wouldn't make enough on his option to provide any real 
incentive, and if the stock drops, his morale will prob-
ably go down too." On the basis of this reasoning Amer-
ican Radiator did not come out with an option plan. Over 
the year 1957, American Radiator dropped in the f i nal ana-
lysis six points. Of the 1523 issues traded on the New 
York Stock ~xehange in 1957, declines outnumbered advances 
by 1068 to 342, with 113 issues unchanged.*** The chart 
of the future is not known, there are no guarantees. 
*26, p. 125. 
**42, P• 119. 
***16, p. A-34. 
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B. Eliminating Risk 
The stock option, in theory, has limited some 
of the risk in stock purchase. Whereas under the type of 
plan prevailing in the 1920's an individual made a con-
tract to purchase, and in most cases was held to that 
contract even when he found himself paying a price for 
the stock which was far above the prevailing market price, 
the option-holder can take a long look and decide if, and 
when, he wishes to buy. Once having bought, however, he 
then faces the risks that confront the man who buys in 
the market, i.e., stock price is subJect to rise and f all. 
Stock dividends do not have to come. Companies can come 
upon h ard times and close their doors. 
In this era, however, recalling the unpleasant 
occurrences of the twenties, some companies, i.n setting 
up their plans, have taken a paternalistic attitude to-
ward their employees. Congress, too, has provided some 
relief with regard to options in that und.er the 1954 re-
visions to the Internal Revenue Code it permits the grant -
ing of an extension of the restricted type opt i on in what 
is termed a "variable stock option."* The purpose of this 
provision is to permit a company to provide an option 
holder with some insurance against a fall in the market 
*46, p . 42. 
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value of a company's stock. In setting up its plan a 
company may, rather than fixing the option price at a 
certain percentage of the market . price at the time the 
option was granted, permit exercise . at a price that can 
be 85% or more of any market value of .the stock during 
a specified six month period. However, the option must 
be exercised during that period. Thus, an option holder, 
if he sees the market price drop, can wait . and exercise 
the option at the lowest price during the six month per-
iod. But what happens if the .sto.ek .continues to drop? 
Then circumstances similar to . "A", above., set . in. There 
can be no option gain unless the stock is sold at a price 
above that at which it is purchased. Of course, if the 
individual is genuinely interested in obtaining stock, 
then he can capitalize on this provision; or if there is 
a temporary market break and themarket .. drops for awhile, 
later recovering, there is opportunity fo~ further po-
tential capital. gain. 
But although Congress has approved of this 
maneuver, it is up to the company to decide whether or 
not it should incorporate 1 t into its plan. It increases. 
the problems of administering the plan. Congress, in add-
ition, also made it permissable for . a company to lower the 
price of stock whose average market value over the pre-
ceding twelve months has been more than 20% below the 
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market price when the option was granted.* 
Companies have also made various approaches to 
the problem of eliminating the risk to the employee ·stock 
purchaser. The increasing use of thrift plans in which 
the employees savings go into government bonds and the 
contribution of the company is made in the form of com-
pany stock, is aimed at this problem. In this instance, 
an employee is only investing his own funds in the future 
of his country and not his company. Whatever happens to 
the company stock, the employee has not staked his own 
money; should he make out well, then it is all to the 
good. 
The majority of stock purchase plans inaug-
urated today permit payroll deductions for payment and 
most of them will permit an individual to withdraw his 
savings any time before he has completed payment and. re-
ceived. the stock certificate. Thus, if the prices start 
to fall, an employee can withdraw from the plan and not 
go through with the purchase. It was the failure of the 
plans of the twenties to recognize and. incorporate pro-
visions of this type that resulted in their disastrous 
plight. Many individuals not . only had to buy the stock, 
at prices far above market, but also found themselves 
put out of a job by the company that had sold them the 
stock. 
*46' p ·. 43. 
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The plans, thrift and simple purchase, which 
turn the funds obtained from payroll deductions over to 
a trustee for safe-keeping and investing, often permit 
what is known as 11 dollar cost. averaging."* When the 
trustee buys stock periodically, each month, quarter, 
six months, he invests a certain fixed .sum each time. 
When prices are high, the given sum buys fewer shares 
than when prices are low. The price per share charged 
to the stock purchaser when enough money has been deduc-
ted to buy a share, the cost is the average that the 
trustee paid per share over a given period of time. 
This results in a lower average price than if a set num-
ber of shares were bought each time. Also, the lumping 
of employee purchases when stock has to be bought on the 
market into purchases of 100 shares or more permits the 
trustee or the company (if there is no trustee and the 
company is handling the program) to enjoy lower broker-
age fees by taking advantage of "round lot" rather than 
"odd lot" charges. 
Of course, the most basic method of limiting 
risk to employees would be a company guarantee to buy 
back the stock at any time at the price paid for it. 
Thus, employee stock purchase would be a riskless adven-
ture. But should it be? Shouldn't the employee stock-
holder, once he has obtained the stock, be subject to 
*38, P• 43. 
"· 
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the ownership . risk that faces any stockholder? The plans 
which contribute stock in proportion to savings invested 
in government securities, or ~hose like the General Motors 
plan listed above which guarantee a return equal to sav-
ings invested plus interest, are probably as risk free 
a proposition as an employee can expect. Building in 
risklessness, however, has been a primary employee stock 
ownership consideration of this era, one constantly re-
miniscent of the experience of the late twenties. 
C. Cost to The Gompany 
Any employee purchase plan will result in ex-
pense to a company. The amount depends, of cours e, upon 
the characteristics of the plan·. A stock purchase plan 
in which stock is sold for a lump sum payment, perhaps, 
is the cheapest. The primary expenses would be the cost 
of advertizing the plan, flyers, posters, the registra-
. tion requirements of the SEC, and the .salaries of admin-
istrative employees. 
The costliest plan probably is that encountered 
in a thrift plan in which the company contributes, for 
example, an amount equal to 50% of the employee contri-
butions. This plan will involve a great deal of expense 
above and beyond the primarily administrative costs. The 
amount of money contributed can amount to staggering sums 
. . 
if the plan is widely received, and one that has a 50% 
company contribution undoubtedly will be. So.cony Mobil 
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Oil Company, for example, contributes "out of its accu-
mulated •$rnings and profits" an amount equal to 50% of 
the employee deduction, to be paid to .the trustee monthly. 
This plan has received wide acceptance by employees with 
88% participating, the majority allocating the maximum 
full 5% of . their pay. Thus the possible cost to a com-
pany can be appreciable. 
Consider, in addition, a cost of a different 
variety, that amount which it costs a company to sell 
stock to employees at a decreased price when it could sel l 
the stock on the market~ If the stock is of real value 
to employees, it probably would be as much desired on 
the open market. Thus a significant cost, though not of 
the paying-out type, may be borne by the company. This 
factor logically brings to mind the following basic prob-
lem. 
D. Existing Stockholders and a Proposed Plan 
Sale of stock to employees, like any sale that 
is not made to existing stockholders dilutes the equity 
of the existing stockholders. How favorable will these 
stockholders be to the management of their company wh~n 
it provides options for many of itself. Naturally, the 
extent of dilution is important. In some companies a 
few may be hard hit. . Perhaps in a widely held company 
there is no significant reaction. It may be felt that 
if it is for the good of the company then it will ulti-
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mately effect, favorably, the existing stockholder, too. 
However, when stock is sold at a discount, or 
when a considerable sum is taken. out of profits and re-
tained earnings in order to subsidize a thrift plan, then 
consideration must be made to the possibility of unfavor-
able stockholder reactions. 
E. Unlisted Companies 
An unlisted company pre.sents special problems. 
It might be possible for a company to launch a. stock pur-
chase plan for employees with stock priced at a. favorable 
level as far as company and employees a~e concerned. But 
what accurately determines the fair market value of the 
stock? What opportunity will an employee with a few 
shares of stock have of selling it, if he should so choose? 
Will one be able to accurately assess its value? Will one 
be able to find a satisfactory purchaser? It is quite 
possible that an individual, needing the funds in a per-
sonal emergency, might be unable to market the stock. 
When a company with unlisted stock is desirous 
of setting up an option plan it has even deeper problems. 
In order to qualify as a restricted stock o~tion, the 
stock must not be priced at less than 85% of the fair 
market value. Capital gains treatment is accorded from 
the 95% level. But, again, how does the company fix 
11 fair market value?" A company closely held, with stock 
unlisted, may offer a restricted stock option to its ex-
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ecutives, setting the option price at what it considers 
to be a percentage of the stock's market value. At a 
later date, however, the Treasury might rule that the 
real market value is much higher than the company's es-
timate. Thus, the company's option price might f all be-
low 85% and the option would not qualify as a r estricted 
stock option . Pr ofi ts whi ch were gai ned upon the exercise 
of t he option would all be taxed as ordinary income and 
the purpose of granting the option wou l d be defeated. 
However, one method has evolved which might 
hel p to relieve companies in this situation. It is known 
as the. McNamara way.* Under this method the company ad-
mits that the option is desi gned to provide compensation. 
In order to qualify for capitals gains treatment, the 
option itself is considered to have .value. This value 
i s the compensation intended. If the executive is will-
ing to pay income taxes on this value for the year the 
option is granted, he may be able to secure capital gains 
treatment on all the profits realized on his option. The 
thinking along this line comes out of a tax decision in-
.volving Harley McNamara, General Manager of the National 
Tea c·ompany. ** He was granted an option on .12, 500 shares 
of h i s company's stock in l945. He at the time arbitra-
*42, p.l46. 
**42, p.l46. 
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rily set a value of $16,375 on the option and paid in-
come taxes on this amount. In 1946 and 1947, McNamara 
exercised his option. Both the Treasury and the Tax 
Court held that he owed income taxes on the entire spread 
between the $16 option price and the price of the shares 
when he exercised· his option, an average price of $28 
per share. However, the 7th. Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed this decision and held that the value of the 
option was the compensation intended and was therefore, 
taxable as ordinary income. And that the profits which 
McNamara made of the option were not compensation and 
should not be taxed until he sold the option stock, and 
then only at the capital gains rate. This case points 
up some of the problems facing the company with unlisted 
stock. It also naturally hints at the next problem. 
F. Chan~ing Legislation · 
What guarantee has a company that the above 
mentioned decision will be upheld in future years? The 
law courts are built on decisions and appeals. The his-
tory of the stock option, itself, bears this out. As 
was pointed out in the earlier chapter on the stock option 
the treatment of the option has caused confusion to the 
tax experts ever since 1921. It took thirty years for a 
decisive stand to be made. And now as with any new bit of 
legislation, it takes time for testing, finding loopholes, 
modifying, etc. Who can guarantee that five years from 
64 
now, options will receive the tax treatment accorded them 
today? Can one be sure that the basic requirements of an 
option will not be changed? Will the capital gains tax-
ation rate for options stay at 25%? Will the holding peri-
od be altered? Many possible changes can be theorized, 
and in an area that has demonstrated progressive differ-
ences of opinion reflected in statutory treatment, one 
can not be sure of the future. Consider the average tax 
payer, for example. Perhaps, one of these days he will 
become antagonized _at the realization that some are re-
calving what appears to be a special . tax break. Concerted 
voices might possibly bring anti-option liberality pressures. 
As recently as January 20, 1958, Stanley H. Ruttenburg, 
director of the A.F.L.-C.I.O research division proposed 
the elimination of capital gain tax privileges and re-
ductions in depletions allowances, dividend and split in-
come provisions of the tax structure.* · Ruttenburg esti-
mated that nine million dollars in revenue could be gained 
by eliminating what he called 11 special tax .privileges and 
loopholes 11 in recent tax laws.** 
G. Historical Ramifications 
Employee stock ownership in this era has had 
to over-ride an inherently 11 bad press 11 • The great de-
*14' p. 3. 
**14, p. 3. 
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pression. raised havoc with the earlier movement. Many 
feel that an experience similar to that of the late twen-
tie.s will never occur again. But despite the level of 
government expenditures, now at an increasing rate, and 
the modern financial structure and operating policies, 
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the economy is no.t depression proof. According to Asher 
Achinstein, of the research staff of the Library of Congress,* 
the postwar United States economy is .basically the same as 
the pre-war economy and not a new model economy that has 
witnessed the 11 break up of the business cycle" as Harvard's 
Sumner Slichter argues .• ** According to Achinstein, although 
we can "count much more on government determination to 
pursue monetary and . fiscal policies to speed recovery, 
these tools are not likely to be adequate when the durable 
goods and construction. industries show .sizable contrac-
tiona. If these conditions should prevail in the near 
future, a decline substantially greater than any we have 
had in the post-war period is likely. 11 Under such an 
event what would happen to . employee ownership? Stock 
options would undoubtedly lose their value. With stock 
price decline an expected occurrence, market price would 
under-cut option price. Those enrolled in payroll de-
duction schemes might be able to get their investment 
*33, p. 30. 
**33, p.30. 
out of option and simple purchase arrangements, provided 
that stock had not yet been purchased and delivered, and 
tha t their company's plans permitted withdrawal. Those 
individuals under thrift type plan s would probably be 
the best off. They could withdraw their own funds in 
most instances and perhaps would only lose company cont-
ributions. If stock had already been obtained, the com-
pany contributions may have compensated for, or absorbed 
much of the loss. But those who had bought stock at 
fixed prices, should prices fall below purchase pri ce, 
face the trying periods that could be expected to result. 
Those possessing unexercised options would find them 
v a lueless. Thus, negative reactions toward employers 
would quite naturally rise. Fortunately, in this era 
there would undoubtedly be very few tied to contracts 
to pay for stock at a price above current market. This 
is one of the bug-a~boos of employee ownership that seems 
to have been removed from present day employee purchase. 
But, as some of the economists view things, the historically 
recurring business cycle effects are still in our midst. 
H. Ownership As An Incentive 
One of the real enigmas of employee ownership, 
and one that will be further discussed in later chapters, 
is the problem of attempting to determine to what degree 
it serves to act as an incentive to employees. Does an 
option granted to an executive to purchase at a favor-
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able price a number of shares of company stock, provide 
the incentive effect needed to induce this executive to 
perform at the very peak of his potential? Does the 
realization that a rank and file worker is paying toward 
the ownership of a few shares of his company's . stock 
spur him on to his maximum productive capacity? This 
question is no't one that can be easily answered. And 
it is not an easy problem for objective investigation. 
There are too many other variables influencing an indi.;. 
vidual's job performance. And the one which would be 
under investigation would be varying in effect as the 
price per share of the "incentive" varied. A drop might 
have a wider negative effect on a day's work t han an 
equ al gain would have a positive effect. Will a man work 
harder to appreciate the value of his share of stock or 
to obtain the funds to buy a new car? Will an execu t ive 
bec ome more absorbed with figuring and spending paper 
gains, and cringing at paper losses, than he will with 
the decisions to be mad.e before him? Will the most im-
portant decision perhaps become when to exercise my option 
or when to sell? Or maybe the realization will come of 
a more pressing problem which will be treated i n a follow-
ing chapter, where will I get the funds to buy the 1000's 
of shares of stock on which I have an option? 
Many of these questions are by their nature 
hypothetical, but they point out important considerations. 
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For if it can be asserted that employee ownership is lacking 
in incentive value, then it perhaps must resort to the 
status of a fringe benefit. 
I. Ownership As A Fringe Benefit 
If a stock ownership plan cannot be considered 
a valuable incentive, then its justification must be in 
placing it in the category of a fringe benefit. And the 
trend of employee ownership in this decade, the minimizing 
of risk, the popularity of the thrift plan, has overtones 
of fringe benefit. Employee compensation patterns in 
recent years have reflected a growth in non-wage benefits, 
pension, life insurance, disability and severance pay, 
workmens' and unemployment compensation, etc •• Perhaps, 
thrift plans fall into this category. They could possibly 
become an extra benefit, an inducement to seeking employ-
ment with a company, and to staying in the employ of the 
company, in order to realize maximum potential gain from 
the plan. The benefits; an opportunity to own company 
stock, provisions for systematic savings, a company pro-
vided dividend for participating. ·This may well become 
the direction of the employee ownership methods of the 
future. The fact that large corporations such as General · 
Motors, whose plan was presented above, and DuPont hav.e 
taken this avenue, gives the movement impetus. Perhaps 
President Harlow H. Curtice of General Motors gives a· 
clue in this direction in his statement that "we all like 
69 
to feel that we are making progress, are getting ahead finan-
cially. We want to have something left over at the end of 
each year •••• something to put aside for a rainy day, for the 
time when youngsters will be going to college or for our own 
later years. The GM Savings-Stock Purchase Program was de-
veloped to help meet this very real problem. 11* 
J. The Union Problem 
One of the problems involved in employee ownership 
which is becoming of increasing significance concerns unions, 
their attitudes toward plans and collective bargaining over 
plans. Historic a lly, labor is on record as having voiced 
considerable opposition toward employee ownership. In the 
middle twenties, the early hey-day of the ownership movement , 
there were made two significant pronouncements. 
At the forty-fifth annual convention of the Ameri-
can Federation of Labor, on October 5, 1925, the executive 
council of the AFL made the following statement in its .report: 
11 Employee ownership has been hailed as 
*12, P• 49. 
'industrial democracy' the owners owning 
the shop or the railroad. Advocates of 
this panacea, have paid no heed to the 
different kinds of stocks and securities, 
not all of which carry the right to vo te 
in regular company meetings . In the case 
of holders of stocks conveying voting power, 
minority halders have little or no opportunity 
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to influence decisions. There are obvious 
technical grounds which deter scrupulous em-
ployers from urging their employees to invest 
in securities of the company which employs 
them. The success of our trade-union move-
ment bas created an investment problem for 
many of our trade-unionists. The determina-
tion of safe -investments is not an easy prob-
lem and requires expert advice. But if wage-
earners strive to make themselves increasingly 
efficient workman and maintain effective machin-
ery for collective bargaining, their wages will 
increase proportionately. If they develop, as 
we hope they will, habits of thrift and proper 
concern for future protection, they will accu-
mulate savings and be looking for investment 
opportunities. With this situation we face 
the necessity, first of knowing just what is 
happening in the form of public and employee 
ownership and thereupon developing construc-
tive suggestions. If dependable investment 
information services are not available, they 
have no protection against sellers of ques-
tionable securities. 11* 
*5, P• 95-96. 
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It is not our intention to pass judgment on 
this statement. It is .obvious that the union is taking the 
position that employers. were influencing their employees 
to buy stock. Today, most companies merely offer it, with 
no attempt to influence purchase. But the attitude of the 
AFL toward the movement is apparent in its statement. But, 
of even greater effect is the statement of Daniel J. T.obin, 
at that time the president of the International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen and Helpers of America, 
a very powerful and respected labor leader. Writing in the 
official journal of the Amalgamated Association of Iron, 
Steel and Tin workers, Tobin made the following statement: 
"If there is anything that is dis-
gusting, it is to find workingmen who 
are foolish enough to purchase stock 
from the concerns by whic~ they are 
employed; who are carried away by the 
soft, smooth talk of their employees 
that they are now part owners in the 
business • . The stock is sold an em-
ployee simply for the purpose of holding 
him to his job; for the purpose of attemp-
ting to make him believe that if he 
strikes against the company, he is strik-
ing against his own interests, and for the 
purpose of keeping him from asking for 
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any increase in wages or betterment 
of working conditions, or anything else 
that might increase the expense of 
operation. It is a fad started by em-
ployers in order to keep their men out 
of unions, and was first put into op-
eration by the steel trust ......• If I 
had money to invest I would never in-
vest it with the company for which I was 
working ••.... It is a mistake for working-
men to buy stock from the companies by 
which they are employed. The boss is sell-
ing you stock so that he may keep you 
tied to your job, to get you to keep quiet 
and not ask for an increase in wages. I 
trust that the membership of our locals 
will not be foolish enough to make such an 
investment."* 
Perhaps, one can imagine Tobin and the AFL telling 
r\ isgruntled workers "we told you so" after many of them 
suffered losses in the depression. With the changing struc-
ture of plans and particularly the advent of a significant 
employer contribution to a plan the Unions have begun to 
develop the opinion that they should have something to 
say in the development of a plan. As a result there have 
*5,pp. 96-97. 
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been some very significant developments. The Atlantic 
Refining Company has negotiated its plan with a number 
of unions representing its employees. The Auto Workers 
Union, however, rejected both the General Motors and Ford 
offers of savings and stock purchase plans. Thus the 
General Motors plan was made to encompass only salaried 
employees of the Corporation. The Ford plan specifically 
excepts those employees who shall be within a collective 
bargaining unit for which a labor organization is recog-
nized as a collective b a rgaining agent by any participating 
company . Some have seriously questioned the Union ' s 
decision in this case, presenting a claim that the . stock 
plan would have benefited the workers in money about twelve 
cents per hour of working time, whereas the plan which the 
Union chose, a so- called 11 annual wage" plan under which 
workers are to be paid for part of the time they are laid 
off, results in money to five cents per hour of working 
time.* The Union, however, has defended its action in 
answering complaints of some of the workers by maintain-
ing that the stock "plan was rejected because it was so full 
·of restrictive provisions that it would have had little 
value even for those who could afford to participate in 
it, and because it did not meet the needs and desires of 
Ford workers as expressed through the democratic machinery 
*56, p. 97. 
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of the Union."* The Union further defended its action 
in that their choice helped the majority of the workers, 
that the workers with the "heaviest financial obligations 
and greatest family responsibilities - those vlho have the 
greatest need - are obviously unable to save anything out 
of their pay. They would have gotten nothing out of the 
plan. The great majority of those with lighter respon-
sibilities probably would not have been able to put aside 
anything like 10% of their pay on a regular basis, week by 
week. Even those who were able to save a small part of 
their pay could not be sure of being able to leave it in 
the plan for over five years," which would be required to 
obtain maximum benefits.** Since Ford stock was offered 
for sale, moreover, the price bas dropped from the offer-
ing level of $64.50 a share to a price as of March 31, 195 8 
of $40~00 a share. (See Char t I.) This undbubtedly bas 
made the Union's choice appear wiser. In addition, the 
Auto Workers have announced that they intend to bring dern-
ands to the corning new contract negotiations for a profit-
sharing plan, which, of course, would include all workers, 
not just those wishing or in a position to take part. 
When Dow Chemical Company initiated a purchase 
plan in 1948 , UMW officials kept silent when members sought 
an official attitude. But later on, when other plans were 
*56, P• 100. 
**56, p. 100. 
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put into effect, the local union told members it had no 
objections.* 
Inland Steel, however, did not offer its first 
plan, in 1952, to coal miners because of the objections 
of the UWN Union. But in 1955, the Miner's Union offered 
no protest and miners are in on the second three year stock 
option plan.*• 
However, one very serious development has arisen 
over union-company negotiations over stock plans and has 
resulted in a very significant decision by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.*** The case 
concerns the Richfield Oil Corporation of Los Angeles, 
California, which on April 14, 1953 announced to its em-
ployees a voluntary "Stock Purchase Plan." The plan had 
not previously been discussed with the Oil Workers Inter-
national Union, CIO, although there was then in full force 
and effect a collective bargaining agreement with that 
union. The union had sought to meet with the company for 
the purpose of negotiations on the proposed plans. But 
the company declined such negotiations and insisted that 
the plan had been "finally adopted 11 subject only to clear-
ance with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, but ex-
pressed willingness to meet with the union 11 for the purpose 
*38, p. 44. 
**38, p. 44. 
***7, PP• 2327-2333. 
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of explaining the plan." The meetings were held but the 
Union proposed modifications and changes in the proposed 
plan. The company advised that it "did. not consider the 
Stock Purchase plan to be a proper subject of collective 
bargaining." The Union thereupon charged the Richfield 
Company with unfair labor practices. In the Richfield 
plan, the employee, meeting certain age and service re-
quirements, may contribute by payroll deductions five 
dollars a month up to 5% of his pay to an account. The 
company contributes in a separate, individual trusteed 
account an amount equal to at least 50% of the employee 
contribution and possibly up to 75% of employee payments, 
depending on year end adjustments based on company profits. 
At the end of his employment, the employee would receive 
all the stock and cash in his account, but stock and cash 
in the "trusteed account 11 received would be dependent on 
age and length of service. "Service" was defined as the 
continuous period of time a worker remained with the com-
pany 11 in accordance with its established policy."* Con-
tinuity would be broken by a layoff exceeding the company 
policy at the time, discharge, resignation, but not by an 
authorized leave of absence. There was no statement made, 
however, concerning the effect of a strike on continuity 
of serVice. The National Labor Relations Board sustained 
*54' p. 448. 
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the charges of the Union and ordered Richfield to bargain.* 
The case was then appealed to the U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals (U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia: 
Richfield Oil Corporation v. National Labor Relations 
Board, No. 12483, January 16, 1956. )** ·The Court held, 
however, that since the NLRB had correctly found that 
a unilaterally introduced employee stock purchase plan 
constituted "wages" and "conditions of employment" the 
Board was entitled to enforcement of its order to the 
employer to bargain with the Union about the plan, despite 
the fact that as of December 1, 1953, 2,547 out of 3,318 
eligible employees had become participants in the plan, 
including 820 out 1,340 eligibles represented by the Union. 
But the Court felt that the plan was more than a mere 
opportunity for the employees to invest in company stock. 
It would be an incentive to the employee to render uninter-
rupted service or at least to cause him "substantial concern" 
as to what would happen if a st.rike should occur. The Court 
felt that since the employer made contributions toward 
stock purchases for employees that the plan fell within the 
scope of "wages" as interpreted by the Board, and that it 
also came within the "conditions" of employment category. 
Thus, this decision could have a decided effect on 
*8 , PP• 1658-1664. 
**7, PP• 2327-2333. 
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a corporation's desire to adopt a plan. There was one 
dissenting opinion among the Circuit Court Justices which 
referred to an excellent dissenting opinion by Mr. Beeson, 
one of the four members of the NLRB which conducted the 
original hear-ings.* Among other things , Mr. Beeson ex-
pressed the opinion that the decision " seems to me an 
utterly unrealistic and danger ous expansion of the usual 
area of col l ective b argaining. It is in my opinion not in 
the interest of the public much less the true interests of 
the parties." Also, 11 the majority likewise projects the 
Union into an inconsistent dual role of representing em-
ployees as workmen interested in better wages and i mproved 
hours and working conditions, and at the same time represen~-
ing those employees who participate in the plan as stock-
holders interested in higher div i dends, etc., •.•• To force 
the Union into this dual position requires neglect of one 
responsibility or the other."** 
Thus, this important deci s ion could have many 
future r amifi c ations in the area of employee O\mership . 
This chapter has focused its attention on many 
of the significant problems of employee stock purchase 
and ownership. These problems though in the main unsolveable 
and in certain respects subject only to opinion analysis 
*8 , pp. 1662-1664. 
**8, PP• 1662-1664. 
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are nevertheless v e ry re a l. The next chapter will i n corpo-
rate into the discussion the point of view of the i ndividual 
emp loyee. 
CHAPTER VII 
EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP 
FROM AN EMPLOYEE POINT OF VIEW 
In analyzing employee ownership, even though 
our concern is management's use of this device, the pos-
ition of the employee, the individual whose money . is to be 
invested, is very important. It also sheds some light on 
management responsibilities. First, attention will be paid 
to the rank and file worker, the man who will be investing in 
a few shares, ?ut, who with his fellow workers can make up a 
great many shares and a large amount of capital; then, the 
focus will be turned toward the executive, some of whose pos• 
itions have been previously exposed. 
A. The Rank and File Employee 
What does the average worker know about stock 
ownership? Probably, very little~ Some workers undoubt-
edly are well versed on the subject and possess inherited 
or personally purchased stock. Others, perhaps, are totally 
ignorant. In the middle of the distribution .comes the aver-
age worker who has a vague notion of corporate structure and 
stock purchase and ownership, but whose opinions are colored 
by vague connotations of Wall Street, speculation, financial 
manipulations, . etc •• Maybe there is a recollection of a rel-
ative or friend who perhaps made or lost substantial sums in 
the depression. But aside from this, there is probably 
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little knowledgeor concern over stock ownership. Savings 
may be channel·ed into a Government Bond program or the local 
bank, or for lack of definite savings planning never allowed 
to accumulate. But should a relative or friend relate that 
he is going to buy stock in his company, or should the.grape-
vine bring word of a favorable option deal for management, the 
average worker may be suddenly interested and begin to wonder 
what stock ownership has in it for him. But an employee 
ownership plan must have a special attracting feature which 
will make it advantageous to the employee to become person-
ally interested. And, this special feature will lead the 
employee to discover what appear to be the significant ad-
vantages in his taking part. Thus, he may be given the opp-
ortunity to buy stock at a lower than market price through 
payroll deductions; he may find it possible to take an option 
and decide later on, in lieu of the stock's performance in the 
meantime, whether or not to buy; or he may find that if he is 
willing to put aside so much, the company will give him so 
much. 
Let us first point out just what, on an overall 
basis, stock ownership in an employee's company has to offer 
him; then, what the different types of plana have to offer. 
The basic underlying advantage to an employee is 
that he will have some incentive to save a portion of his 
earnings. :Payroll deductions appear to be .one of the most 
painless ways of putting money aside. The use of payroll 
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deductions to accumulate tax and social security payments is 
familiar. The percentage that is taken out periodically is 
easier to part with than is a lump sum; and the amount of 
wage which is not received does not present the problem of 
bow to dispose of it~ Thus, entering a stock purchase pro-
gram can be considered a method of encouraging a beneficial 
habit, that of thrift. In addition, the accumulations help 
to build up the worker's ~eeling of security. Perhaps, tbe 
accumulation is alloted to retirement days, perhaps, it is 
accumulated as an insurance .against inflation, or is saved for 
the proverbial rainy day. But whatever the motivation, it is 
helpful to the employee. 
FUrthermore, there is the opportunity of obtaining 
more return on the savings than could be obtained from a 
convential savings bank or from government savings bond inves- · 
tment. 
Taking an intelligent part in a company plan will 
give an individual who is otherwise unaware, valuable insight 
and knowledge in our economic system. Mere.ly reading the pr.o-
spectus and other material used to introduce the company plan 
will provide the employee with valuable information. 
On the other hand, there are general disadvantages 
inherent in employee ownership. Once the stock has been 
purchased, the worker runs the risk that any stockholder does. 
The value of the stock can fall. It can become worth less 
than the worker paid. Or while the value may hold up, 
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there may be a period in which there are no dividends and 
· the worker has lost the interest which would . have accrued had 
he placed his money in a savings bank. Or perhaps, the indiv-
idual finds that he s.uddenly needs money. It ma.y not be easy 
to rapidly convert his stock holdings back into cash. More-
over, can one justlfy an individual investing his money in the 
company for which he works? Is there not an unjustifiable 
concentration of risk? Might not the same downturn of the 
business . which · causes d.ividenda to atop, causes the sompany' a 
stock to decline in value, also caus.e the worker to b a laid 
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off? From the point of view of the man whose money is at stake, 
a general appraisal of employee ownership may lead one to con-
clude that it is scarcely worth while. On the other hand, a 
closer look from the employee vantage point at the three main 
types of programs may alter this thin~ing somewhat. 
1. The Simple Stock Purchase Plan 
In review, this type of plan will either provide 
the employee with: a) a given amount of stock :for a given 
sum of money; b) a given amount of stock after the accumulation 
through payroll deductions of a certain sum. The first alter-
native is an on the spot gamble. The .only apparent inducement 
to the employee is that probably the price is lower than 
market and that perhaps brokerage and other fees and red tape 
are avoided. Otherwise, the transaction would be no different 
than buying the stock on the market. The worker must decide 
whether, at the time the opportunity to buy is open, the 
price out is worth the risk. Perhaps, the worker never 
gave stock ownership a thought. Perhaps, he is in a relatively 
comfortable financial position. If the individual thinks he 
can afford the gamble, he oa.n take the chance and buy. But 
one should not endanger his personal financial position. 
This situation probably faces an individual with a minimum 
amount of time within which to decide whether or not to buy. 
The company announces that it has made available an offering 
of stock for employee purchase. For example, Whirlpool Corp-
or~tion, on December 15, 1954, announced a Stock Purchase Plan 
which offered stock -at 85% of fair market value on the date 
of granting the purchase privilege, terms of payment·, one pay-
ment.* Thus, the employee, if he is in a financial position 
to buy, will undoubtedl~ attempt to get some advice and then 
make up his decision, which from an employee point of view, 
hinges purely on the personal judgment of whether the 15% 
inducement is worth the risk.. Add to the plan, however, a. 
provision that payment will be made by payroll deductions 
and that the individual will have the right o cancel up until 
II . 
the time of .: del1yery of the _stock, with cancellation privilege 
returning amount of deductions plus interest • . This cancella.-
tion privilege is a vital addition. For it dlfferentiates 
the employee 1 s position from that of the above one payment 
plan. If there is no oano.ellation privilege, then the 
*12, p. 176. 
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employee's position is practically the same. He is given the 
opportunity to pay through payroll deduction. However, onee · 
the. employee signs up to purchase, be is held to the purchase. 
Irregardless of the performance of the stock, the. employee 
makes his payments in full. This arrangement is typical of 
many of the purchase arrangements of the plans that were intro-
duced during the twenties. It should be stated that not all 
companies held employees to their agreements. when prices 
tumbled to fractions of subscription price. Some did relieve 
the workers of the burden of periodic payments until he was 
in a better position; others ·reduced payments until he was in 
a better position; others. reduced the debt; some relieved the 
individuals of further payment; and a few bought the stock back 
from the individual at the purchase price.* Thus, from the 
employee point of view, a cancellation provision is roost im-
portant. Its effect is similar to tha~ of the .option in the 
sense that the individual can refuse to buy, comparable to 
not exercising the option in the event of unfavorable price 
performance. With the privilege of paying through payroll 
deductions with .or without favorable price reduction, the 
employee is in a better position to take . a chance. He can 
subscribe and while he is accumulating his . fund, le.arn mor.e 
about stock ownership, studying, in particular, the behavior 
of the stock under purchase. Over a period of time his own 
*6, P• 212. 
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financial needs may improve or weaken. There is more time for 
judgment; there is the chance .of backing out; and less of a 
risk to the individual worker. But th~ employee's position 
is improved. In a sense he gets a second chance to act. 
2. The Stock Option 
The stock option, of course, adds its particular 
attribute. The individual· employee can .l ay claim to an option 
and then hold off and decide whether or not to exercise. Price 
may be .fixed or variable. There is time for making up one's 
mind. But method of payment becomes important. For if .the 
payment is in one sum, then the employee must have the money 
ready upon exercise of the option and at this point the .decision 
is ·similar to that in the simple stock, purchase, one payment, 
except that .the employee has .the opportunity of determining 
the time to purchase which is most beneflcial for the fixed 
price involved or the time period over which to set up a var-
iable option price. If the motive of the employee is Just to 
turn over the stock and make something. on the transaction, 
then this plan has his interest. For he does not have to exer-
cise if prices do not appear favorable. Although, be would 
have -to hold the stock for six months bef ore selling, in order 
to get capital gain treatment. And this motive can be upper-
most in the employe.e's mind~ With the. opportunity for payroll 
deduction payment, then the value of thls type of plan .in the 
eyes of the employee can be enhanced. For one could combine 
the features of the option, deciding when to buy, with the 
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benefit of paying in installments. Of course, once the option 
is exercised, then, there is no cancellation of the purchase. 
To the employee, it would appear that the option 
does present a more favorable ownership program. There is -the 
opportunity for personal judgment and a minimized risk pos-
ition. 
3. The Thrift Plan 
The thrift plans bring up a variation, however, 
to the alternatives that have faced the employee in the pre-
ceding instances. With the emphasis o~ continuous savings 
over a period ot years, for example, five years in the General 
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-Motors plan as presented above, the thrift plans reduce, from 
the employee point of view, the opportunity of using the stock 
for speculative purposes. But speculation oonnotates risk and 
the thrift plan minimizes the. employee's risk. Does it thus 
minimi.ze .potential gain? That it does not, necessarily. In 
many instances it provides more of a gain tban . :would most 
ordinary stock purchase or option metho.ds as far as the rank 
and file worker is concerned. Cons-ider, again, the General 
Motors plan with the 50% employer contribution. In considering 
the welfare of the average .rank and file worker, the thrift 
plan does appear to present the very best opportunity for 
taking advantage of a stock acquirement plan. And when, 
in addition to a substantial employer contribution, the plan 
guarantees the employee the amount of his investment plus 
interest, again, consider the GM plan, no matter how the 
stock prices behave, then its value should be appreciated. 
It is apparent that. as . the. consideration . has p.assed 
from the simple purchase plan through to the thrift. plan, 
the position of the rank and file worker has become less risky 
and more . favorable; on the other hand., . the plans themselves 
have become more complex, subject to more .qualifications 
and components. The positio.n of the employer, however, has 
been the opposite, from an independent one to one of continual 
involvement and increased complications. The management point 
of view, however, will not be presented until the .. next chapter. 
Before then, let us appraise the. position of the executive, 
officer, management level of employee as distinguished from 
the rank and file. 
B. The Officer Level 
Ownership, from the executive point o:f view, takes 
on a different picture. There are several obvious differences 
from which to start. The financial .position is much better, 
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on the whole; the executive. is in a better position to influence 
the future activity of the company and to a very limited degree, 
correspondingly, of its stock; the tax reduction possibilitl:es 
through the use of stock purchase for capital gains, in lieu 
.of conventional rates for increased compensation through a sal-
ary increase, are far greater and more significant. Further-
more, to a limited degree, depending on one's definition of 
what should be considered. management, there are the arguments, 
pro and con, which can be made in theory, for assimilating 
management with ownership. Thus, one could start here and 
determine on the basis of the owner-manager concept, whether 
stock should be made available to management personnel. But 
let us examine the situation from the view-point of the exec-
utive to whom is presented the opportunity of buying company 
stock. 
Certainly, the executive has a much deeper aware-
ness and understanding of stock ownership than the average 
rank and file worker can be e-xpected to demonstrate. There 
is a much greater possibility that some stock may be owned. 
Undoubtedly stock purchase has been .contemplated, and perhaps, 
in many instances, individuals have weighed in their own 
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minds the advantages and disadvantages of buying their company's 
stock. 
In considering the executive point of view, some 
attention should be paid to an informai offer. For example, 
a small company with 3, 4, 5 key men, stock closely held, 
unlisted, offers one the opportunity of buying a large block 
of stock. The situation can be a highly risky one for the 
executive given the offer. The electronics industry of today 
can be a prototype. Many small companies, highly competitive, 
a high cost operation. Some companies will make out well in 
the long run; many will fail. The executive who is approached 
with the opportunity of buying, say 1000 shares, is in a tick-
lish position. First of all, there is no accurate way of 
determining the fair market value of the stock. Developments 
are changing rapidly; concepts are being constantly revised 
and improved. A. company may be in the rore-front today and 
lert behind tomorrow. Thus, the individual is taking one 
big risk in that he does not know exactly what he is getting. 
Secondly, he will, undoubtedly, have to sacrifice whatever 
savings he has in order to buy. Thirdly, he certainly will 
not be ofrered enough to obtain anywhere near a controlling 
interest and thus, will not have very much control over fUture 
operating policy. Furthermore, if he refuses the ofrer he 
will probably be looked down upon by the top men as not having 
the interest a.nd conridence in the operation to risk his own 
rinances, and as a result, his job may be sacririced. But, 
in addi t i on, ir he should buy, there is no guarantee of a sale 
in the event the individual is later in a personal financial 
position in which he .has to sell. Thus, an extremely ·risky 
and ticklish situation is presented to the executive who is 
"favored" with an inrormal ofrer to buy company stock. This 
unusual situation is not one to be overlooked, for it undoubt-
edly is a common occurrence in smaller companies. Analyzing 
rrom the other side, however, the situation could also be 
such that the individual might have the insight to see a good 
buy and the possibility or gaining control in the future~ 
The formal ofrer, however, is the more common, 
at least more publicized method. Advantage is not limited to 
tax advantage through the use of favorable tax treatment by 
way of capital gains, which usually dictates sale ·of. some or 
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all of the stock. First of all, the executive has the 
opportunity of acquiring some stock for security, protection 
against inflation, estate planning, retirement and pension 
days. S~condly, there is the opportunity of getting the 
stock at a. favorable price. Th1rdly, the possibility of 
investment income with a greater gain than conventional sav-
ings. 
On the other hand, there 'is the element of risk and 
possibility of a loss. In general, the position of the exec-
utive is similar to that of the rank and file employee, only 
it is on a much larger scale. The executive has the opportu-
nity of buying more stock, but .must invest more money; he can 
incur greater gain, but also larger loss. But let us examine 
the executive position with respect to the different types 
of purchase . plans. 
1. Simple Stock Purchase Plan 
The simple stock purchase plan. provides an exec-
utive, officer, key employee, with the. opportunity of buying 
his company's stock with or without a price concession, with 
or without a convenient method of payment. The officer is, 
perhaps, better able to assess his own position with regard 
to purchase and also the company's potential, ·than is the 
rank and file. But in the end he must decide whether or not 
it is worth the risk, and must make the same self-appraisal 
which faces the rank and file employee. 
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2. The Stock Option 
The stock option, however, complicates considerably 
the executive's position. The option usually is granted on 
a rather large number of shares. Most plans, of .course., are 
only for executives. Those which are open to executives and 
rank arid file employees will usually by the mechanics of 
~etermining the maximum number of shares per individual, 
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allot more to the executive, i.e., percentage .of yearly sal-
ary, or so many shares per so much salary, etc •• The great 
majority of option plans require payment in one sum at the time 
of exercise. This requirement complimented by the inherent 
risk involved in sto.ck purchase gives .the executive something 
· for very serious thought. Let us consider some of the im-
plications of financing a purchase of stock through exer-
cise of an .option requiring payment in one lump. sum. The 
following true example was narrated by V. Henry Rothschild, 
a prominent New York attorney, specializing .in corporate and 
tax work.* In 1950, an executive received an option . which 
would permit him upon exercise during the ensuing five year 
period to purchase .100,000 shares of his company's common 
.stock at $17.75 per share. His annual salary was $200,000, 
which afterhis federal and state income .taxes yielded him 
about $76,000. He already owned 5,000 shares and later 
stated that these shares, plus the option shares which he 
*44, P• 137 • 
95 
was able to purchase and retain, represented substantially 
all of his life 1 s savings. Could this executive pay $1,775,000 
out of his funds to buy the stock? When he did exercise his 
option in 1953, the shares had a market value of over #2,500,000. 
By pledging the stock this executive was able to obtain a bank 
loan which covered the purchase price of the shares. After 
the six ·month holding period the executive sold 75,000 of his 
100,000 shares in order to pay off the bank loan. Thus, he 
was left with only 25,000 of his option shares. In 1956, this 
same executive received a second option to buy 100,000 shares, 
this time at a price of #49.64 a share. In the meantime, .he 
had sold 15,000 of the shares which were purchased earlier. 
Exercise of this second option would involve financing of 
almost #5,000,000. The same pattern would have to be fol-
lowed and relatively few shares could be retained. But, sit-
uations of this type are far from unusual. Consider the 
figures: of 393 option plans reported by the New .York Stock: 
Exchange between 1951 and 1956, 352, practically 90% called 
for as terms of payment, "one payment."* To the individual 
the problem is of utmost importance. To what extent can he 
attempt to manipulate his finances~ He has other obligations. 
Ther:e is no guarantee once the stock . is .purchased .that the . 
future path of the market price will point upward. The actual 
case experience of a well known executive will illustrate the 
*12, p. 134-207. 
point. In 1950, Radio Corporation of America granted . to 
its board chairman, David Sarnoff, an option on 100,000 
shares of company stock.* In February, 1953, when the stock 
was worth #25.50 per share, or #7.75 above the. option price, 
Sarno£f decided to exercise his option and obtained #1,775,000 
in personal loans f~om banks. Five weeks after Sarnoff had 
exercised his option, the market price of R.O.A. stock had 
risen to #28.25 per share. Had Sarnoff been free to sell at 
this time, rather than having to wait . out the six month hold-
ing period, he would have had. a capital gain of $1,050,000. 
But, he had to wait. In the meantime, the stock ~egan to fall 
and by September, when the six month holding period had ex-
pired, the stock had dropped to $23.50. At this time .the 
banks were unwilling to renew Sarnoff's personal loans in full 
and he decided to sell some of the stock. A public unloading 
at this time, of course, would have very seriously depre_sse?-
the falling market price. In order to avoid this occurrence, 
Sarnoff sold 75,000 shares, 75% of the .opti.on incidentally, 
to private investors for about $21.50 a sha.re. This gave him 
#1,612,500, but to this he had to add most of his personal 
savings to pay off his loans and acquire the remaining 25,000 
shares free and clear. Had Sarnoff been able to hold on to 
all his option stock, he would have had a potential. capital 
gain of $1,250,000 as of December 31, 1957. As it was, he 
*42, P• 144. 
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made a capital gain of $281,250 on the 75,000 shares and 
had a potential gain of $312,500 on his remaining 25,000 
shares as of December 31, 1957. Granted that in the end 
Sarnoff made out well and could show a substantial. gain, what 
would have happened if R.C .A. had not turned up? The example 
does show, moreover, that executives who obtain potentially 
valuable options are playing the market. The option does pro-
vide the advantage that an individual can, for ,an extended per-
iod take a position in the market risk-free, without tying up 
any of his capital. In Sarnoff's case, he qad until November, 
1955, within which to exercise, a five year option. · But, the 
basic problem for the executive is to pick the right time. 
Remember, moreover, that a man in order to qualify for capital 
gains treatment cannot cash in his stock, purchased by means 
of an option, until two years after he gets the option. In 
addition, he has to hold the stock, himself, for six months 
before he can sell. A man .who exercises his option in the 
early part of the two year minimum waiting period is taking a 
good-sized gamble on a bull market over a long period which 
can be as much as two years, if he exercises the option as soon 
as he gets it. Sarnoff, although his two year minimum per-
iod had passed, still had to hold the stock for the six month 
period, during which time the market was sliding from its peak. 
If he had exercised his option six months before November, 
1952, the first date at which he could sell for the best tax 
treatment under the rules, he would have been in a much more 
flexible position during the 1953 market decline.* But, 
in his situation, he had to wait until the market came close 
to the bottom. Of course, the deterrent all along, to making 
the most of his option was the huge financing problem, i.e., 
he had . to raise #1,775,000 to buy his 100,000 shares. Sarnoff 
insists, the reason that he sold his stock at all was that 
banks would not renew his loans.** 
Options with big money value may be easy to finance 
in a bull market, but extremely difficult in the face .of 
falling prices or uncertain economic conditions. Executives 
must be keenly aware of these factors and honestly ask them-
selves if their financial position can warrant exercising. 
One cannot guess how many officers would be in the financial 
position of financing an option purchase out of their own 
resources. The demands of taxation, new homes, new cars, 
life insurance, summer camps, hobbies apd ent.ertainment 
undoubtedly take their toll of executive salaries. Yet many 
may hate to pass up the opportunity of buying the stock if 
the investment appears safe., for capital gain purposes, 
building up personal equity, estate planning, etc., But in 
financing the deal out of the purchase, itself, capitalizing 
on the appreciated price, a · .great number of the shares have 
to be sacrificed and the individual is left with a am.a.ll 
*32, p. 92. 
**32, p. 92. 
98 
-- -
·-
portion as was seen in the .examples above. on- a comparativ~ 
basis, the following table demonstrates the self-fina~cing of 
a 1,000 share stock option at #50 per share.* 
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Appreciated Percentage Percentage Number Of Number Of 
Market Price Increase Of Stock Shares That Shares That 
Per Share In · Price, ·. That Must Must Be Can Be 
Be Sold Sold Retained 
$62.50 25% 84.1 .841 159 
75.00 50 72.7 727 273 
87_.50 75 64.0 640 360 
100.0.0 100 57.1 571 429 
116.50 133 50.0 500 500 
250.00 400 25.0 250 750 
Thus, it can be seen that if . the stock rises 50% 
the executive will still have to dispose of 72.7% of it. It 
. . 
will have to rise 100% in price before he can keep 50% of the 
stock. This, furthermore, assumes that he is able to get the 
bank loan to buy in the first place. If he cannot negotiate 
a loan, there will be no chance of buying. 
It is evident, thus, that when the individual 
company officer becom~as personally involved with an option 
deal there is much that involves tr-ery serious reflection. 
3. The Thrift Plan 
Although the thrif.t plan seems in its construction 
to be pointed towards the rank and file, that is, by institut-
ing regular payroll deductions, with incentive attached, 
officers are often eligible. For example, the Hercules 
Powder Company Employee Savings Plan of 1956 (25% company 
*44, P• 138. 
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contribution) is open to all employees of the company, 
including officers and directors who have completed at le.ast 
24 months of creditable, continuous serivee; Chrysler Corp-
oration's Thrift-Stock Ownership Program, 1956 (company 
contribution determined by .the program) is . open to salaried 
employees of the .. corporation and its. subsidiaries; General 
Motors Savings-Stock Purchase Plan, 1955 (company contributes 
#1 for every $2 contributed by the employee). is. open to .sal-
aried employees of the corporation.* Thus, . with maximum de-
duction usually based on current or past salary, up to 10% of 
salary at GM, officers are .in a position to have an appreciable 
amount deducted, and with. the addition of the .company's eon~ 
tribution, will in time amass a considerable sum with a mi~ 
imum of risk involved. 
In looking at employee ownership from the. employ-
ee point of view, it e.an be seen that no definite rule.s .. of 
thumb can be stated. One can mak.e an . appreciable sum, .one . 
can earn a steady income, acquire substantial stock holdings, 
develop an .estate, build a hedge against inflation, in fact, 
there are many possible favorable results to an individual. 
On the other hand, the venture may not _tu.rn out pleasantly. 
There can be losses as well as gains, and there ·can be con .. 
siderable emotional .stresses developed over the prospective . 
possibilities. Inter~mixed with ownership, no matter whether 
*12, PP• 182, 196. 
the situation is ~avorable or disillusioning, the employee-
owner is faced with the problem that confronts a:ny owner. 
Periodically, ~e asks himself, shall I hold or sell? We 
have considered some of the factors which face the stock 
purchaser when he is deciding how to act with regard to pur-
chasing, but, this decision to hold or sell faces the general 
stockholder and should be mentioned. To the average worker 
the cash in hand may look better than the potential of the 
stock certificate. Should the market riseappreciably and 
the employee foresee the -opportunity of a gain, should he 
decide to sell and pocket his pro~it made on .the . employee 
ownership transactio~? If the market begins to drop, should 
he decide to sell feeling . that it . . may drop much lower? Or 
should the individual hold the stock, come what may, for 
security, in order to have something to fall back on? The 
holder of a considerable number of shares must .meet the same 
problem. Should the .executive sell and reap a capital gain 
profi~ , or should he hold on for retirement or estate pur-
poses?. 
Thus, it can be appreciated that the employee, 
rank and file, .or executive level, upon deciding whether or 
not to buy stock offered to him by a company must make many 
personal reflections. The difference between individuals, 
their individual positions, the differences between com-
panies and their ever changing present position, the e~fect 
of economic forces and world conditions bring too many 
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variables into the equation. Thus, the only answer for 
I 
each employee is a realistic appraisal from his personal 
point of view. 
CHAPTER VIII 
EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP 
FROM A MANAGEMENT POINT OF VIEW 
Looking at employee .ownership through. the eyes 
of management brings into balance the other side of the com-
pany-employee relationship. In the previous chapter, it was 
pointed out that the employee, in buying company stock, has 
the chance of so much gain, in money and other forms, and 
of so much loss., in money and o.ther forms. In this chapter, 
a consideration will be made of what the company can lose 
or gain in presenting .the employee with the opportunity to 
buy. It will be seen, moreover, that. the relationships 
are in some situations direct, that is an employee gain 
can be a company gain, a company loss can be . an employee 
loss, but in other interactions, indirect. But as the 
company, the corporation, the legal being, acts and speake 
through its management, management's expec.tati.ons are the 
company's expectations, and as management thinking is often 
divided over the possible effects of di.fferent policies, it 
is similarly divided over the possible effects of a policy 
of employee ownership. Let us, therefore, first examine 
what the company management expects to receive in benefits 
to the company from its proposed ownership plan. The anal-
ysis will follow that of the previous chapter, presenting 
the rank and file and the execut.i ve relative reactions. 
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As was stated previously, the inherent position of the two 
incorporates as differences, the amount of stock which it 
is possible to buy, the amount of money to invest, the level 
of understanding, intelligence, knowledge of stock ownership, 
and the extent to which the individual is in a position to 
influence the future course of operations. 
A. Management and The Rank and File 
One of the primary advantages to the management 
of many companies resulting from a simple stock purchase or 
a stock option plan for the rank and file is the amount of 
capital which rebounds into the company. Some managements 
refute t his as being one of their purposes for offering 
s t ock to the employees. Others do not hesitate to frankly 
admit that it is one of their positive reasons for making the 
offer. The president, Cleo F. Craig, Jr., of AT&T, whose 
plan was presented earlier, and which .has had considerable 
success with employee ownership, made this statement:* "The 
immense demand for telephone service in the post war period 
has confronted the Bell System with the greatest construction 
program in its history. As part of the program for raising 
large amounts of new capital, two plans have been placed in 
effect under which employees have been permitted to purchase 
stock. In 1946, the s hare owners authori zed a plan for the 
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sale of 2,800,000 shar es to employees through payroll allot ments 
*12, p. 2. 
and substantially all of these shares were purchased by them. 
With continuing need for new capi-tal a second and similar 
plan for 3,000,000 shares was authorized in 1950. 11 
To the unlisted company which does not desire a 
public offering, a sale to employees might prove the most 
effective way of raising new capital. 
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Many companies, however, disclose as their expressed 
reasons for offering stock, a desire to assist their employees 
in acquiring savings • . For example, Leland I. Doan, President 
of Dow Chemical has stated:* 11Basically, however, our prin-
cipal interest remains that of encouraging our people . to 
independently accumulate estates by offering them a means that 
is both convenient and attractive. 11 According to R. J. Cordiner, 
· President of Gene_ral Electric, the u Company believes that it 
has a well rounded program to encourage and assist its employ-
ees in properly managing the financial aspects of their lives."** 
Charles G. Mortimer, President of General Foods has stated 
that 11 the directors and officers of General Foods have long 
considered it sound corporate policy to encourage and facili-
ta-te savings by employees and are convinced that an .. employee 
stock purchase plan should be a part of that over-all program."*** 
These are the statements of the top officials of leading and 
successful companies. But what underlies their statements? 
*12, p. 25. 
~*12, P• 29. 
***12, P• 39. 
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Certainly, their companies are not in .business for the pur-
pose of building employee savings. A report to stockholders 
which featured the information that the company was success-
ful in the past year in that it contributed so muc h to the 
financial position of its employees would not be expected 
to bring applauding reactions from , stockholders. The company 
management therefore must consider its stock program a suc-
cessful means to an end. That is, that the program will 
atrengthen _management ... worker relations and will serve as_ an 
incentive which will show ita e~tect in maximizing pr oduction, 
minimizing costs, increasing profits. The worker who has 
decided to buy, has made an investment of his own funds . He 
seeks dividend return and appreciation of the value of his stock 
certificate. Management feels that in return he will become 
more dedicated to the company and to his work. For example, 
working hours will be spent maximizing production in terms of 
the individual's contribution. He will have an incentive t o 
work as rapidly as possible, to do the best work pos sible, to 
refrain from "soldiering", to limit "coffee breaks 11 to the 
prescribed number of minutes, to come to work on time and not 
leave his bench until the proper time to go has come . Further-
more, sick days will not be taken unless a worker is actually 
sick. The hope is a work effort which will eliminate many 
of the intangible productive work losses. Collectiye action 
of this kind on the part of all workers would make a significant 
contribution to the company's operating success. As a 
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complimentary reaction, the worker's attitude toward his 
job and his company, call it morale, esprit de corps, team 
spirit, etc., will be correspondingly improved and increased. 
There will be accord and harmony between the labor and 
management forces of the company, a realization that all 
are working toward a common goal. In as much as the workers 
have · become owners, they will realize that where the ownership 
of the company is· now more diffuse, they are not only con-
tributing to the dividends of the outside sotckholders, the 
absentee ownership, but now to their own portion of ownership. 
Thus, the hope of management that company ownership of stock 
will spur worker effort seems to be the most significant 
cause for management's usa of the device. There are, never-
theless, other plausible reasons for offering stock. 
A company which has proven to be unusually suc-
cessful for many years, may feel that it would like to reward 
some of its faithful employees. Thus, it gives them the 
opportunity to buy stock and share in the company's success. 
The company might be in a position to give the stock to the 
employees. A few years ago, a New England company which 
had been successful for many years rewarded each of its 
employees with a new car. Many companies give annual cash 
bonuses, some give a stock gift. But, then it may be felt 
that the philanthropic appl'oach is perhaps not the most 
advantageous. Maybe that which involves some personal payment 
invokes more appreciation on the part of the individuals • 
. 
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A management may feel 'that its stock is a valuable possession 
that it would liketo share ownership with employees who 
have worked to make it such, but, feels that the best 
approach is . to offer it to the employees at a certain price. 
Furthermore, it might be felt by management that 
employee ownership may draw the employee closer to the side 
of management than that of labor. As was pointed out pre-
viously, labor has had a.n .anti-ownership attitude. for years. 
Ownership by employees might make them more under-
standing of management policies and problems, with a readiness 
to consider the management point of view, as well as the em-
ployee point of view. Perhaps, management-employee communi-
cations will be improved in that, in addition to the labor 
publications, the company periodicals will be read, the effect 
of different courses of action analyzed, the annual report 
read and studi.ed and discussed. 
It is imagineable that company ownership ·can appre-
ciably alter the orientation and point of view of the rank 
and file. 
One must not forget the historical evolution of 
employee ownership from the profit-sharing movement as was 
sketched in the earlier chapter. It is undoubtedly. true 
that many -managements have turned to stock offering from, 
or as an alternative to, profit-sharing. The company's 
outlay of funds in adopting a stock ownership plan is much 
less than it would be in adopting profit-sharing, and the 
outlay is of an indirect rather than a direct nature. 
Furthermore, profit-sharing is probably considered more as 
a wage additive by th~ rank and file. Problems of a non-
sharing year are avoided. The entire employee population is 
not affected and, yet, it might be possible in non-sharing 
years to pay a dividend to stockholders, thus, satisfying 
the worker-owners, whereas, were the workers under profit-
sharing, there would be no payment. 
Thrift plans, involving a substantial continuing 
company contribution, need added management . justification. 
In a sense, they actually provide a profit~share to those who 
are willing to save through the invested deductions. Thus, 
from the management point of view, they are almost a reward 
to the willing employees. It is very possible that in the 
final analysis, they will become the most recent addition to 
company fringe benefits. In the long run, they result in a 
substantial accumulation to those employees who take part. 
Yet, they demand only regular deductions and in many instances 
guarantee to the contributor at least the value, in stock and 
cash, of investment plus interest. Is it then not unusual 
that over 86% of eligible employees elected to participate 
in the General Motors plan, which was presented earlier, in 
the initial enrollment.* 
*12, p. 49. 
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Of course, management has expectations, and in 
addition to those mentioned above, length and continuity 
of service become significant. To maximize the amount each 
worker can withdraw he must remain in service a specified 
number of years, contributing actively each year. Thus, if 
an employee is spurred to remain in service by virtue of 
the thrift plan, then manageme.nt guarantees itself a corps of 
reliable, trained workers. Thus, experienced workers are 
engaged in production; worker turnover is reduced; hiring · 
costs are cut; training costs are reduced. 
In return for its gift, management has its ex-
pectations. Moreover, if the ownership plans do the job 
that management proposes for them, their incentive effect is 
substantial throughout the organization, the company prospers, 
profits, then stockholders, those who owned before the em-
ployees were taken in, get added dividends and feel that 
management's policy of offering stock has been justified. 
But, is the picture from start to finish so simply 
and cheerily painted! Ther are memp.ers of management t ams, 
boards of directors, who will not be looking at the same 
portrait when they sit down to judge employee ownership. 
First of all, one may ask, to what extent and with what jus-
tification should a company intervene in the savings and 
investment problems of its employees, particularly with 
respect to a proposition as risky as stock ownership. Pay-
roll deductions to a savings bank, for a Christmas Club, 
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Vacation Club, Government Bonds, very well, but for stock 
investment, No! It is too risky for us to encourage our 
employees to invest. their savings in stocks. Unless we 
can guarantee them the return of their investment, then we 
should not urge them to buy stocks. Furthermore, we would 
violate a basic principle of investment~ that is, diversify 
your investments, by inducing our employees to put their 
savings in the same hands as their job. This argument- has 
deterred many managements from incorporating employee ownership 
into their operating policies. Some, in addition, refer back 
to a disastrous experi.e:Q.ce with ownership during the depression. 
Others will make a plan available for the convenience of those 
employees who. are desirous of purchasing, but will caution 
their workers, seriously, about the risk involved. For ex-
ample, Herman W. Steinkraus, of Bridgeport Brass Company, 
has stated, "In connection with our established practice of 
trying to keep our employees fully informed about our company, 
we found that ~ increasing number of employees not .only 
applauded our policies, . but inquired as to how they could be-
come stockholders. For a long time the Board of Directors 
pondered this matter, because .some years ago, before the com-
pany was listed on the New York Stock Exchange, and while 
its securities were held by a limited number of individuals, 
an employee stock purchase plan put into effect had not 
worked out ·successfully. No promotion of the plan has been 
undertaken because the Directors feel that any employee 
wishing to become a stockholder should know that such a 
plan is available ~o him, but should not feel any urge 
from management to take up the plan."* 
Willis Gale, Chairman of the Board of the Com-
monwealth Edison Company addressed the following remarks 
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to the employees of his company: "We are not trying to induce 
you to buy Edison S'tock. If you wish to participate in the 
plan we will be glad to have you do so. BUt your standing 
will not be affected in any way by your decision. No one is 
authorized to urge you to participate. Prices of common 
stocks, including Edison stock, go up and down. At times 
the decline may be drastic."** Said Joseph L, Block, Pres-
ident of Inland Steel Company: 11 0ur program is voluntary. 
--
No employee need participate. In fact, great care is taken 
to explain tha~ . the purchase of common stock is. a risk which 
might result in loss.· as well as profit. 11 *** Thus, the alert 
managements of some of the highly regarded companies appear 
to have adopted employee ownership out of . deference to the 
wishes of the employees, and have thus taken efforts to make 
it available. Much of the employee demand is undoubtedly 
a by-product of the post-war. rising stock market and the 
publicity given ownership by way of the liberalizing of 
*12' p. 7. 
**12, P• 18. 
***12, P• 57. 
the tax treatment of options. Nevertheless, there are 
significant arguments for deciding not to offer. 
As was mentioned earlier, it can cost a company 
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a considerable amount of money to make an offer to employees. 
For a company whose stock is of high value and desirable 
should be readily salable on the open market or might well 
be taken up by existing stockholders with pre•emptive rights. 
Such a company which S$ll a stock at a discount to employee s 
might well expect a much great r return from sales on the 
market or to stockholders. In addition, the company would 
not have to entail the expense of administering the plan, 
which can become a full time job for certain clerica~ employees 
and be a significant part of an executive's job. Explanatory 
circulars, payroll deductions, trustee accounts, posting, 
figuring interest, and the many other aspects of administering 
the job will run into costs. If management feels that it is 
worth the cost, then it must feel that the incentive effects 
on the employees will be the justification in the long run. 
But what proof does ma~agement have that the plan will serve 
as an incentive! Management has no way of measuring the 
incentive effect and it is probably doubtful. 
Does the individual. employee feel that he, one of 
hundreds or thousands, can influence to any significant 
degree the overall profit posi tio·n of the company. It is 
unlikely that his habits will be changed to any degree, or 
that his attitude and relationship toward his immediate 
superior will be positively strengthened. The good worker 
will remain as good a worker, the poor worker will not im-
prove. The cause and effect relationship is not close 
enough. It is not as if a worker knows that if he produces 
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so many parts he will get so many dollars, and fo~ a per-
centage more he will get an increasing percentage of dollars. 
Here the output throughout the week is reflected in the pay 
envelope at the week's end. It is a direct, expected account-
able relationship. There is inc.entive: if I produce so much, 
I know I 1 ll get so much. Stock ownership, on the other hand, 
does not say that if you produce so much this quarter, or 
this year, at the end of the quarter or year your dividend 
per share will be .so many dollars; rather, it says that after 
a quarterly or yearly period of operation, as a result of 
sales, expenses, taxes, investments, policies, etc., a net 
profit may result. Depending on our future plans and com-
mittments, a certain amount will be put aside for dividends. 
Dividing this amount by the number of stockholders we have, 
will give you your dividend. Is there direct incentive in 
this system? It may be that for some there is a degree of 
incentive. BUt, the successfUl company with a successful 
employee ownership plan cannot be said to be a success 
because of the plan. Rather, the plan is a success because 
the company is a success. Without the plan it would still 
be successful. Perhaps, it . helps to keep the company 
successfUl, in that, workers sharing in .the dividends . are 
contented, and thus, morale is kept at a high peak • . But, 
some successful companies have found that their plans proved 
to be disappointments because of their success. That is, the 
value of the stock increased, the employee .saw a chance to 
make a profit and sold the stock, pocketing the .profit. What 
is of more interest to the employee ., the sense of ownership 
or the extra money in his hand? In many instances, the cash 
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is probably the deciding criterion. Might not management 
decide that if -it is in this position, .why offer a stock -owner-
ship plan, undoubtedly, a wage increase would be more revered. 
Furthermore, the management does not then, have to take the 
gamble of the possibility of the value of the stock dropping 
due to unforeseen, economic or othe.r", circumst.ances. This 
factor can be an important deterrent to a management offering 
stock to the rank and file. 
Declining stock prices can create much ill will 
toward a company and have a definite effect on the morale .of 
the stock-holding employee. The non-stockholding .employee 
is not concerned as long as his weekly pay check comes intact. 
He, perhaps, is not even aware of the stock drop. The stock-
holder, however, might be tempted to sell; notice of employees 
selling might lead others to believe that .there is something 
wrong inside the company and thus, the market price might be 
fUrther deflated. The history of the earlier employee 
ownership movement revolves around this problem. The falling 
market has undermined many plans. 
But there are other considerations which man-
agement can make against offering its rank and file the 
chance to buy. The average worker does not have a great 
deal of money to invest. There are .many demands. on his 
weekly wage. Perhaps, it is best for him tq satisfy his 
needs, provide himself with adequate. life insurance, medical 
protection, contribute to the pension or retirement fUnd, 
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and with what little is left over, put it into liquid savings 
that it be available should an emergency occur. For, if this 
extra amount is invested in stock, red tape might make it dif-
ficult to convert it back into cash if needed. It might prove 
costly to convert. Furthermore, stock ownership involves 
complications for the employe.e' s tax picture and what guar-
antee is there that future legislation might complicate it fur-
ther. 
In ·addition, the possible future ramifications of 
the Richfield decision which was analyzed earlier, may prove 
to be a determining factor for managements with collective 
bargaining agreements, who might be considering employee 
·ownership. 
Thus management can make a very fair case agains t 
offering stock to the rank .and file, respecting its own position, 
the position of, and its obligations to, the worker, and the 
possible effects on the company~ 
B. At The Management Level 
When executives are considered, the problem 
becomes more complicated; primarily as a result of the 
. stock option, but also because the management is in many 
situations passing judgment on a prospective plan designed 
to benefit itself. Self-judgment becomes a very difficult 
thing, particularly, when the pot-of-gold can be .imagined. 
The option, being the primary form, today, of stock 
plan for executives, .has found its way into many company pol-
icies. How does it look through the eyes of management? 
Principally, its aims have been either to retain or obtain 
top level management talent, and to reward current members 
of the management team. It is not primarily an incentive de-
vice aimed at inducing better effort. The management per-
sonnel deemed worthy of an option should .not be those who 
need an incentive to maximize productivity. Rather, the in-
dividual's psychological_ make-up, training, personal1 ty, at-
titude toward employment, desire to be successful, primarily 
should maximize his productive effort. Or perhaps, the com-
petition to move up in the organization, or a do the job or 
lose the job atmosphere, are .sufficient incentives. The pay 
for the position should be determined by management as fairly 
and accurately as possible. The generous option permits 
management to bargain with a key executive who is thinking of 
leaving. It permits a management to attract to the company 
high calibre personnel, or to lure away from another company 
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a valued individual. Thus, the real value to the company 
or the option is the extent to which management can use it 
to accomplish these results. Secondarily, management uses 
the device as a reward for itself, as an alternative to rais-
ing its salary, in recognition of a job well done.' Here it 
becomes an incentive to continue to fulfill a vi tal function 
and also to thwart any latent thoughts of leaving the company. 
As a reward, the purchase at a favorable . price permits the 
executive to build up an estate, and to prepare adequately 
for retirement. 
But, as has been analyzed previously, there are 
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two detriments to the successful . runc.t.ioning from the man-
agement point of .view of these options. First of ·all, a ris-
ing market value is needed; secondly, the exercising of' the 
option often presents serious problems in personal financing. 
Although, upon granting of the option, it fulfills its purpose, 
that is, induces a key man to stay with the company, attracts 
some desirable outsiders, gives existing officials a feeling 
of satisfaction and recognition, later developments can under-
mine the executive structure. Consider the effects of a dec-
lining market on an option laden management, or a management 
which has certain key executives holding options. No better 
example of repercussions on management can be supplied then 
the recent stock market slump·. For the option craze .accom-
panied the blooming bull market of the past half dozen years. 
Options have brought many executives immense profits, at 
least on paper.. But, the bull market .ended July 12, 1957 ·* 
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Since then, as the market has dropped, .many sto.ck option 
plans have become worthless to both the executives and the 
companies concerned. But, even prior to the turning point 
in the market, there were some warning~ of danger ahead. A 
study conducted by the Economic Unit of the u.s. News and 
World Report for the period January 11- April 10, 1957, 
showed that officerB and directors of . the larger corporations 
sold more stock in their own companies than they bought.** 
Perhaps, keen individuals were making the most of their stock 
deals before they thought lt too late. Executives, naturally, 
have intimate knowledge of company operations, cyld developments 
which might affect the value of the company's stock. Because 
of this, however, it is required by law that sales and pur-
chases in company stocks be reported to the Government in 
order that stockholders may become aware of intra-comp~y 
dealings.*** 
With the declining market showing on signs of a. 
sharp turn up, the Wall Street Journal contacted officers of 
sixty American corporations which had granted options to 
executives within the prior two year .period, at which time 
their stocks were selling on the market at prices around 
*58, P• 1. 
**57, P• 104. 
***57, p. 108. 
their post-war highs. Their findings are not surprising•* 
The market decline punctured the balloons of many management 
personnel. How does management relieve, and how does the 
company suffer from, the .attitudes of these key management 
personnel who have stated:** "Sure, no one promised me I'd 
make money on the option, but it was held' out as an employment 
attraction and now itJs a mirage." This officer found the . 
market value of his firm's stock at #7.00 below the option 
price. "The current market has made a complete farce of our 
stock plan," concedes the secretary-treasurer of a Dallas-
based oil company. "stock options were purely a gold mine 
back in the days when the market .did no.thing but go up, but 
now they have lost a lot of their allure. 11 *** 
How can one detennine the effect of this reaction 
on management performance? Certainly, a management bas made 
every effort to effect favorable reactions on .the market. 
Of course, management can reply to rumblings that members of 
the management team who have not exercised, really have not 
lost anything, they were merely granted an opportunity, not 
a guarantee. But, for the individual, potential gain may 
have vanished; others may have exercised and now possess de-
valued stock. Management morale will be affected, for the 
management personnel are individuals and human. 
*58, P• 10. 
**58, P• 1. 
***58, p. 1. 
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In addition, the situation presents .an added pro-
blem, of which Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line. Company .presents 
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a specific example.* Some 135,000 shares of s .tock have been 
taken up by the 80 executives covered by the Panhandle .plan. 
The option price is #54.00 a share. The price as of January 2, 
1958 was #37.25 a share. The Panhandle management is con-
cerned, naturally. BUt, in addition, foresees added operating 
difficulty. An official of the company aptly described it:** 
"It could become serious any day now .if we hired a new top 
employee and gave him an option on say, 1, 000 shares. a..t below 
the existing market price of our stock. If we don't give 
him the option at below market price, he'll squawk and we 
may not get him. But if we gave him the break, then other 
executives may hear about it and feel they h&d been discrim-
inated against for having devoted many years to the company.'' 
Thus, the option .plan has backfired on existing management 
personnel and has been frozen to new personnel. The table 
presented on the following page compares the price per share 
of the option offerings of representative companies with the 
· market price per share on recent dates. 
The problem of financing an o.ption deal, which 
was analyzed in the preceding chapter, strikes, in 'many in-
stances, right back at the individuals who, in fact, created 
*58, P• 10. 
**58, p. 10. 
TABU: I 
PRICE PER SHARE OF STOCK OF REPRESENTATIVE COMPANIES 
ON RESPECTIVE DATES IN COMPARISON WITH OPTION PRICE 
Price Price 
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Company Option Price Dec. 2la 1221 Mar. :21 1 ·19:;28 
Alaska Juneau Gold #3.25 #2.12* #2.87* 
Black & Decker 30.39 38.62 37.62 
Cincinnatti Gas 19.00 29.00 30.37 
and Electric 
Columbia Carbon 45.00 31.00* 35.62* 
Continental Can 45.00 40.37* 47.62 
Eastern Stainless 39.90 26.50* 35.00* 
Steel 
Emerson Radio 6.25 4.00* 5.62* 
Ferro 27.37 16.25* 19.75* 
Flinkote 42.00 37 .50* 42.75 
Grayson-Robinson 3.75 5.87 6.62 
Korvette 10.00 10.00 10.50 
National Steel 62.50 52.75* 50.50* 
Panhandle Eastern 54.00 37 .25* 40.37* 
Pipeline 
Pennsylvania 21.00 11.37* 11.62* 
Railroad 
Royal McBee 38.00 18.75* 17.00* 
Santa Fe Railroad 28.50 17 .00* 18.12* 
Scott Paper 77.00 58.00* 64. 37* 
Shell Oil 81.14 68.00* 70.00* 
Western Maryland 47.81 49.50 59.00 
Railroad 
*Denotes Market :Price Lower Than Option Price 
Source: Wall Street Journal 
Original Sample by Wall Street Journal, October 21, 1957. 
the plan, and rebounds to the stockholders. The stockholders 
point of view is defensible. The stockholders usually 
are not eligible to buy the stock at a lower than market 
price. Management is, in theory, working for the stockholders 
and management members are already getting enough money. 
The granting of options increases the amount of common stock 
outstanding and thus, reduces earnings per share. Moreover, 
the granting of so many shares that the executive has to sell 
in order to finance, or perhaps, the granting of enough 
shares so that the executive can .sell in order to finance 
and retain some s hares for himself, is a wasteful issue from 
the stockholder viewpoint. In many instances, a larger per-
centage falls into the hands of outsiders than remains in the 
hands of executives. Undoubtedly, many existing stockholders 
would gladly have bought these shares at the prices at which 
the executives were favored. Furthermore, stockholders are 
frequently asked to ratify stock option plans on the ground 
that they will provide a means for executives to acquire a 
proprietary interest in the corporation. No proxy statement 
or proposal has been found in which it was explained that 
exercise of the option might be financed, in whole or in 
part, through sale of option stock.* Yet, when this financ• 
ing method is used, the percentage of proprietary interest 
retained by the executive may be so small as was demonstrated 
*44, p. 138. 
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in the previous chapter, as to give rise to complaints 
by stockholders that they were not properly informed about 
the plan and its operation when their approval was: sought. 
Yet, is not management supposed to be protecting tpe interests 
of the owners? Should special tax privileges be provided 
management at the expense of the lower income stockholders 
who pay the full tax burden? Are not stockholders justified 
in stating that if corporate officers have any faith in their 
own company, why don't they invest in its stock through the 
open market? So far, however, protesting stockholders seldom 
have been able to muster enough strength to defeat an option 
plan proposal.* 
In this chapter the analysis has considered man-
agement's relations with employee ownership. It is apparent 
that plans are proposed by management with the possible be~ 
efits which might accrue to the company from the plan in mind. 
However, it has been demonstrated that very serious dangers 
can develop. Moreover, the undesirable results are not un-
usual exceptions. Our most recent economic period provides 
excellent examples of these undesired resu.lts. Management 'a 
position with respect to employee ownership requires extensive 
reflections.. The reaction of its policies can sometimes be 
personally experienced. 
*58 t p. 10. 
CHAPTER IX 
THE INDIVIDUAL COMPANY AND THE DECISION 
TO OFFER STOCK FOR EMPLOYEE PURCHASE 
It has been clearly demonstrated in the preceding 
chapters that sale of stock by a company to its rank and 
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file employees and executive level personnel is no internal 
panacea. In the second period in the history of American 
industry of widespread popularization of the device, however, 
few managements can completely overlook it. Most companies · 
will probably give employee ownership some thought and there 
can be expected wide diversity of opinion. Generally speaking, 
to the small closely held, unlisted, company it probably is 
of insignificant interest. Is there a compelling reason for 
putting the stock outside? The capital may be needed, other-
wise, the possible benefits of employee ownership are not 
reasons enough to justify its inclusion .in the .active policy 
file. Consideration of the problems involved in attempting 
to assess fair value, legal and administrative requirements, 
will probably deter further thought on the part of the ~wners. 
A private deal between owners ·and a non-owning executive is 
another situation which was considered earlier. In this 
situation, caveat emptor! 
Some small companies, nevertheless, have taken a 
rather unique approach. They have sold stock to t he employees 
who can own it as long as they work f or the company. Upon 
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leaving the company, however, the stock reverts back to 
the company. This is a ,special kind of employee ownership. 
For some companies it will have the effect of providing incen-
tive and yet not tying on a burden. Swett and Crawford, 
one of the country's largest general insurance agencies, 
recently adopted a plan . of this type.* On December 31, 1956, 
Messrs. Swett and Crawford sold all their stock, which was the 
extent of all the stock, to the corporation. The next day, 
January 1, 1957, the stock was sold to 160 staff members . 
Arrangements have been made such that in the future, stock 
holdings of an employee, retiring, will automati call y be r e-
allocat ed to the corporat ion and re-sold. At all t imes t he 
stock will be owned entirely by employees act u ally wor king 
for t he company . The idea is no t ac t ually new, however. 
General Radio Company has had a similar ownership program i n 
effect for many years . In special case s the method has its 
place . 
Other companies may f ind certain legal bars to 
selling stock to employees. Recent ly, a New York fire in-
sur ance company attempted to initiate a stock opt i on plan. 
However, the company was legally barred by the Attorney Gen-
eral of the state. According to a state stock corporation 
law, a moneyed corporation is forbidden from issuing any 
*41, P• 17. 
un-issued stock to employees of the corporation.* Further-
'· more, the law forbids a moneyed corporation from issuing 
options to purchase any authorized shares of stock. 
These, of course, are special cases, but they may 
decide the case for a given company before it is well on the 
way toward developing a plan. But, · for most companies, the 
prototypes of those who have or have not adopted plans, a 
I 
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serious approach must be taken. There are probably two sources 
or pressure for a plan; fi rst, a member of the management 
team who feels that this is just what the company needs; and 
secondly, from the employees. The first should be the more 
lightly taken of the two. It is the author's feeling that 
there is too much of a chance of a backfire for management to 
think, on its own, of flirting with a plan. In the precedi.ng 
discussion many of the possibilities pave been presented. For 
maximum success, a steady or preferably rising market value , 
without subsequent employee sale, is the requirement. But, 
it can not be made to order. 
When the employees bring pressures for a plan, 
management must take sound action. Although sometimes hard 
to determine, it must attempt to seek out the underlying 
causes of the workers' demands. Have the neighboring com-
panies adopted ownership plans? Will we need this extra 
inducement, this extra fringe benefit, in order to compete 
*40, p. 25. 
on the labor market. If so, then competition for labor 
must be rather tight and business is good. How long can 
we expect it to last? Timing is a very vital factor in 
judging the value of a plan. One that has started at the 
beginning of a prosperity wave might bring maximum henefits 
to employees and the company. One started at the peak can 
bring disastrous results as the economy falls off toward a 
recession. Thus, a management must accurately assess its 
position in the business cycle and in the cycle of its indus-
try. Then a company must make a serious reflection of what 
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it has to gain or lose. Many of these factors have already 
been mentioned. In addition, i .ts operations are significant. 
A company such as American Telephone . and Telegraph can boldly 
lead with a plan for its employees. The company, however, i s 
in a unique position. It is guaranteed a certain percentage 
return of its investment. When operations are not -prosperous 
it can legally petition for a rate . increase. But the company 
which is ' a eub-co~tractor for the government and in a comfort-
able position might, suddenly, find contracts cut. How will 
its business life continue, let alone its purchase plan! The 
"big league" corporations are of course in the most favorable 
position to act. Great amounts of stock are usually outstand-
ing and issues to employees are only a very small fraction. 
Stockholders and employees are scattered, control is fixed. 
Yet it is the success of these plans, in the companies which 
are in a more favorable position to incorporate them, which 
are given influential publicity. And often times, the 
small companies like to emulate and follow the large ones. 
But, first of all, they should investigate the experiences 
of their colleagues. Some surprising things can take place. 
The Cleveland Pneumatic Tool Company presented an 
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excellent example.• This company makes · aircraft landing gears 
and controls. The company's stock is employee owned; forty-
nine percent by the rank and file; and fifty-one percent by 
160 key executives. In June of 1956, the 1,600 rank and file 
employees went on strike for union contract gains and against 
management policies and plans. Substantial employee ownership 
in this case .being no guarantee against a strike, not pro-
moting harmonious labor relations, not diverting employee 
attention from economic gains and -their own interest. 
The Cineinn~tti Enquirer, a daily newspaper in 
that city, which was saved from being taken over by a comp-
etitor in 1952 by employees who even mortgaged their homes 
to help, and which has in the ensuing period become more 
prosperous, with larger profits than ever before, has had 
several serious internal wrangles between the employee and 
management groups over .control and operation of the paper.** 
One interesting cau.se of dissension was an attempted stock 
option deal by management which was successfUlly thwarted 
by representatives of the employees. 
*28, P• 60. 
**34, pp. 110-112. 
Furthermore, a company management should examine 
the historical market price behavior of its stock over diff-
erent periods of time. How has it compared with the cyclical 
trends? Some company stocks behave differently than most. 
Again timing becomes most important. 
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As it considers its decision, management must ana-
lyze the characteristics of the type of plan it would deem 
most satisfactory. There are pecularities in each. The fix-
ing of each aspect of the plan, determining eligibility, admin-
istration, will point out inherent difficulties. Also there 
must be kept in mind the legal technicalities, the demands 
of the SEC and the Internal Revenue Code. An awareness of 
pending legislation .is important, particularly with regard to 
options. 
In the final analysis, management must balance the 
possible gains with the possible losses in the long run. The 
success of a plan cannot be determined until all the returns 
are posted. The objective analysis should examine the decision 
from this view-point. Many companies have suffered losses, 
financial and intangible, from plans. Have any suffered 
because they did not have an employee ownership plan? 
There is one other recent development which should 
be mentioned in that it has the sponsorship of the New York 
Stock Exchange and has been sanctioned by some companies.* 
The method is known as the Monthly Investment Plan and is 
*59, P• 1. 
offered by member firms of the New York Stock Exchange. 
Companies who so desire to make the service available to 
employees make d eductions from thei r pay and forward them 
to the local cooperating firm, which works with t he employee 
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in setting up, administering and performing the function of 
investing the funds in any of 1200 securities. All of the 
firm's facilities are open to the individual and the company's 
stocks do not have to be a part of the investment, which is 
up to the discretion of the individual, with whatever coun-
selling and advisory service he may seek from the firm. It 
is quite possible that for many companies who do not wish to 
become involved with stock purchase plans of any type, this 
method may solve the problem of coping with the desires of 
those employees who would like to invest some of their earnings 
in stock. 
CHAPTER X 
CONCLUSION 
This study bas sought to examine the employee 
ownership movement of our present day. It has presented the 
historical background of the movement of this decade. An 
intensive presentation has been made. of the mechanics of the 
different types of ownership plans; simple stock purchase, 
stock option, and thrift plans. The detailed provisions of 
typical company plans, illustrating the three basic types 
have been included. Examples and illustrations have been 
incorporated from the plans and experiences of various com-
panies. The main body of the study . has consisted of an inter-
pretative analysis of employee stock ownership and has con-
sidered the relative positions of employees at both the rank 
and file and executive level, and of the company which is con-
sidering the adoption of a plan. 
What, theoretically, does employee ownership of 
stock have to offer? What has sparked its development? Bas-
ically, to employees, the hope of extra income, possible long 
range security against inflation, an opportunity for spec-
ulative gain, the possibility of building an estate; to the 
company, the hope that employees will be motivated to better 
productive efforts, will come to, or remain with, the company 
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as loyal and devoted workers, and that favorable company-em-
ployee relations will be promoted. Thus, in the final analysis, 
employee ownership offers certain hopes, but very little in 
the form of guarantees. Some companies, some individuals, 
have profited from an employee ownership plan, but others 
have suffered irreparable damages. The many unpredictable 
factors make absolute judgment of a given plan an after-the-
fact analysis. For in an area of this type, cause and effect 
are difficult to identify and segregate. The attitude of 
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the union, the stockholders, the market climate and stability, 
existing and proposed legislations, and many other factors, 
bear on each company's case. The management which must decide 
for or against employee ownership must do so fairly weighing 
the alternatives and intangibles. Some .members of the manage-
ment team will favor, and others will oppose employee owner-
ship. But all must keep in mind the fact that each company's 
position with regard to employee ownership is individualistic 
and unique. Because employee ownership appeared to be a suo-
cess or a failure in other companies in the area, or in the 
same industry, does not, necessarily decide the case for a 
given company. 
However, in certain instances, as a tool of manage-
ment, the device may be of significant value. But its worth 
must be determined by the degree to which it motivates ind-
ividuals to maximize productivity. In a young, small, but 
rapidly expanding company, with excellent future potential, 
ownership by employees might provide the extra bit of motiva-
tion that will spark employees to best productive efforts, 
thus benefiting the employee through the increased value of 
the stockholding, as the company grows and prospers; and 
benefiting the company, not only by the increase, or at least 
constancy, of production, but also, by providing capital. 
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Perhaps·, for example, in a . service type of business, 
one involving outside calls on customers, the fact that the 
employees own a part of the business may provide sufficient 
incentive to cause them to control their own work, and cor~ 
respondingly, to make as many installations, or contacts, or 
repairs, as is possible in a given day. Thus, in special cases, 
the application of employee ownership may be rewarding to a 
company. However, it must be kept in mind that in a situation 
in which employee ownership appears to be of value to a com-
pany, although it may provide motivation in the short run, it 
will continue as a useful device only to the degree that the 
value of the company stock rises or at least remains stable 
and the individuals receive period.ic dividends. Declining 
value or lack of dividends will rapidly overcome any initial 
benefiting effect and bring questioning unrest to the employ-
ees who have invested their own funds in their companies. 
The employee ownership movement in this era is a 
direct resultant of the liberalization of the tax treatment 
of the stock option. That . such an event ever came about can 
be attributed to the unusually high level of prosperity which 
has existed in this country in this past decade. Successful 
stock ownership, by its nature, feeds on prosperity and a 
rising market. It becomes desirable for purposes of income 
gain and for dollar valuation security when inflationary 
factors devalue dollar worth. A plan which is introduced 
and reaches fruition on an upswing can become a success -in 
that those subscribing have the opportunity of acquiring 
some gain, and the company possible benefits from the satis-
faction of its employees. But timing is in many instances 
pure luck. The changes in market behavior are hard to pre-
diet, and correspondingly, the future success of an employee 
ownership plan. When there is the slightest bit of uncer-
tainty in the minds of management accompanying the announce-
ment of a plan, whether for employees, executives, or both, 
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it should be put aside at once. In the long run, the possible 
Jrisks outweigh the possible gains as far as both the company 
and the individual employee are concerned. 
In summing up, it appears that the future of employ-
ee ownership will display two relatively unrelated movements. 
, 
For the rank and file, the tendency, as a result of 'the dev-
elopment and · popularization of the thrift type plan, seems to 
be towards the incorporation of employee. ownership as a fringe 
benefit. Surely, some employees of successful companies will 
display an interest in obtaining company stock. Management 
feeling that it cannot use employee ownership as an incentive 
device may seek to satisfy those desirous of purchasing stock 
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by having open an avenue whereby the unpressured oppor-
tunity to buy the stock is provided by a company. However, 
in the long run, the undertaking of General Motors, DuPont, 
Ford and others, in establishing thrift plans with generous 
company contributions may set a precedent for the large corp-
orations and for those other companies in the financial pos-
ition to support a similar plan. These thrift plans are 
certainly, practically, fringe benefits, perhaps, to even-
tually be merged with pension and/or retirement plans. The 
individual setting a certain sum aside, the company rewarding 
the individual who keeps active in the plan, and correspond-
ingly, in the employ of the company, with its contribution. 
This method eliminating risk, guaranteeing employees a min-
imum reimbursement, and due to the extended period involved, 
not feeling as extensively the effects of short term recessions 
or periodic market breaks. Moreover, management personnel 
can reap worthwhile advantages through participation in a plan 
of this type. 
The option type plan which is primarily aimed at 
the management level, is in essence a part of the problem of 
executive compensation, for its development and use is essen-
tially as a compensation gimmick. However, as long as the 
liberal tax treatment of restricted options continues, the 
device will undoubtedly continue in use, thriving on a rising 
market, and producing disgruntled and anxious executives as 
the market drops. But unless this section of the tax law 
is changed, or until someone comes up with something new 
that will capture executive imagination and fulfill the 
functions for which the option has been used, the option 
will continue to be used, but as a result of the experience 
of many in the most recent market slump, on a more selective 
basis. 
It is hoped that this study may prove of value to 
an individual interested in buying stock in his company, by 
explaining the different types of offers, their operation, 
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and what the individual stands to gain or lose; and to man-
agement, by presenting an open-minded analysis of theory and 
current practice in the area of employee ownership which may 
be useful in understanding the possible use of this device as 
a management tool, the advantages and disadvantages to a com~ 
pany of the different types of plans, and assisting a decision 
to adopt or to avoid employee ownership as a company policy. 
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